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Sammenfatning
Atferdsfinans er et fagområde som studerer hvordan forskjellige psykologiske faktorer
påvirker finansiell beslutningstaking i finansmarkeder. I denne masteroppgaven er
atferdsfinans brukt som utgangspunkt for en studie av investorers atferd i det norske
aksjemarkedet, med fokus på to separate temaer innen fagområdet: The Disposition
Effect og Herd Behavior. The Disposition Effect er en utvidelse av Prospektteori, og
omhandler investorers tendens til å selge vinneraksjer for tidlig og holde på tapere for
lenge. Herd Behavior beskriver hvordan investorers flokkmentalitet fører til at de tar
beslutninger basert på hvordan flertallet handler, og ikke nødvendigvis basert på sin
personlige informasjon. Oppgaven er delt i to separate artikler, hvor begge bruker
datamateriale fra Oslo Børs for å undersøke om det finnes tilfeller av henholdsvis the
disposition effect og herd behavior i Norge. Ved å inkludere bevismateriale fra det
norske aksjemarkedet vil denne masteroppgaven bidra til å utvide den eksisterende
litteraturen om investoratferd i industriland. Gjennom bruken av flere utvalg av ak-
sjer på Oslo Børs over perioden januar 2000 til desember 2013, finner vi spredte bevis
for the disposition effect og ingen bevis for herd behavior i Norge. Dette indikerer at
the disposition effect og herd behavior ikke påvirker priser og volumer i det norske
markedet i betydelig grad, noe som er konsistent med tilsvarende studier i andre
industriland. Resultatet kan delvis forklares med at investorer i disse landene har
tilstrekkelig tilgang til variert informasjon og investeringsmuligheter i enkeltaksjer,
og delvis med at det kreves bedre modeller i atferdsfinans for å undersøke investorat-
ferd i reelle aksjemarkeder.
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VAbstract
We examine investor behavior in the Norwegian equity market by studying two be-
havioral finance phenomena: The Disposition Effect and Herd behavior. Both utilize
market data from Oslo Stock Exchange. This thesis will contribute to the existing
literature on investor behavior by including evidence from Norway, characterized as a
developed market. In the disposition effect paper, the methodology employed on the
data examines the relationship between volume at a given point in time, and volume
that took place in the past at different stock price levels. In the second paper focus-
ing on herd behavior, a model that analyses the relationship between cross-sectional
absolute deviations of asset returns and the corresponding market returns is used
for the main part, while the final part combines the volume perspective from the
disposition effect study with relevant assumptions for detecting herd behavior.
The empirical analysis of the disposition effect presents scattered evidence, suggest-
ing that the disposition effect exists to some extent in Norway. In addition, the
evidence for tax-loss-selling, representing the opposite prediction of the disposition
effect, is limited. Equivalently, by using the cross-sectional approach for detecting
herd behavior we find no evidence of herding in the Norwegian market. In addition,
no significant signs of herding are found in the investigation of herding through a vol-
ume perspective. Our results for the disposition effect and herd behavior in Norway
suggests that they are not powerful factors in determining equity returns and vol-
umes in the market, coinciding with similar empirical research on developed markets.
This can partly be explained by sufficient access to diverse information and invest-
ment opportunities on individual stocks, and partly by the lack of comprehensive
empirical models.
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INTRODUCTION 1
Introduction
The central unifying concept of finance is asset valuation. Standard (or modern) finance,
originating from the 1950s, has introduced an avalanche of financial theories such as the Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), arbitrage pricing theory
and option-pricing models (Olsen, 1998). Modern finance theories assume that the world is
dominated by rational investors focusing on expected utility maximization, and the models tie
together finance and the entire economy in elegant theories using rational expectations (Shiller,
2003).
According to standard finance theorists, rational decision-makers make optimal use of all avail-
able information. As a result, all agents achieve their optimum, and equilibrium is reached in the
market as price equals value. Fama (1970) remarks that even though ingenuous investors may
push security prices away from intrinsic values, more sophisticated traders will find it worthwhile
to correct any mispricing. This perspective is called the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH),
and it states the premise that all available information has already been reflected in a security’s
price or market value. It can be noted that the EMH does not assume that all investors are
rational, but it does assume that markets are rational (Ritter, 2003). To eliminate the effect of
irrational traders who for instance follow trends, smaller elements of ‘smart money’ offset the
actions by selling when the irrational optimists buy, and vice versa (Shiller, 2003).
One of several conditions for capital market efficiency is that all information is available to the
market participants. Fama (1970) acknowledges that this is not descriptive of markets in the real
world, but he argues that market efficiency is still applicable if a ‘sufficient number’ of investors
have access to available information, and he claims that this condition exist to some extent in
reality. In his article, Fama performs an analysis of empirical evidence for market efficiency,
and concludes that the evidence in support of the efficient market model is extensive. However,
Shiller (2003) remark that in the 1970s, some finance journals started to report anomalies that
did not seem to be in accordance with the efficient markets theory. Thaler (1999) discusses
different areas in the real world that seems at odds with the theory: the large volume traded
each day, the excess volatility observed for stocks and bonds, the paying of dividends, the large
equity premium and the partial predictability of future returns.
Anomalies affect fundamental decisions, so they are of interest and importance to economists in
finance and other sectors (Fromlet, 2001). Misvaluations are often identified by arbitrageurs in an
effort to make money, and in practice their trading maintains efficient markets, but misvaluations
are of two types: those that are recurrent or arbitrageable and those that are nonrepeating and
long-term in nature. According to Ritter (2003), trading strategies can keep a pretty efficient
market for the recurrent misvaluations, but it is impossible to identify the other misvaluations
until they have passed.
Fama (1998) asserts that the reported anomalies are only chance results, consistent with the
market efficiency theory. In his paper, he discusses recent studies on market inefficiency, claim-
ing that since the evidence and arguments on anomalies split roughly even between over- and
underreaction, they can be attributed to chance, which is predicted by market efficiency. In ad-
dition, long-term anomalies are sensitive to methodology, and tend to disappear when exposed
to different techniques and measurements. Fama’s counter-argument towards critics of the EMH
is that market efficiency can only be replaced by a better model of price formation that specifies
judgment biases in investor behavior and capture the anomalies observed in the markets in a
better way than the simple EMH. So far, the anomalies literature has not accepted the discipline
of an alternative hypothesis, and Fama concludes that the predictability of the EMH still holds
up rather well.
2 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the modern finance paradigm has been challenged by a new and now established
field, Behavioral Finance, which has provided evidence that contradicts the notions of efficient
markets through the introduction of psychological aspects. De Bondt et al. (2008) write that
behavioral finance theories study the nature and quality of financial judgments and choices made
by individual economic agents, and examine what the consequences are for financial markets and
institutions. It is evident from multiple incidents and crises in financial markets that investment
portfolios are frequently distorted, with consequent excess volatility in stock and bond prices, and
it will be problematic to discuss these without reference to investor psychology. Thaler (1999)
emphasizes that the contribution of behavioral finance is not to diminish the fundamental work
that has been done by pioneers of the modern financial theory, but rather to extend it and make
it more realistic by adding a human element.
According to Baker and Nofsinger (2002) traditional finance typically focus on how investors
should behave, while behavioral finance examine how people actually behave in a financial setting
and is, therefore, descriptive. Moreover, behavioral finance incorporate observable, systematic
and very human departures from rationality (either because of preferences or because of mistaken
beliefs) into models of financial markets and behavior (Ritter, 2003). Statman (1999) argues
that normal people are not always rational, that is: (1) they do not always care about utilitarian
characteristics, but rather value-expressive ones, (2) they do not have perfect self-control, (3)
they are confused by cognitive errors, and (4) are sometimes averse to regret. Such ’noise traders’
can affect security prices. Therefore, behavioral finance assumes, in contrast to EMH, that in
some circumstances financial markets are informationally inefficient (Frankfurter and McGoun,
2002).
Most published behavioral finance studies have an empirical component and show a high pre-
dictive value, but are criticized due to their lack of robustness (Van der Sar, 2004). Usually in
behavioral finance, observed anomalous behavior at an individual level of decision-making is used
to construct a behavioral model for a higher aggregate, while the standard finance approach aims
at deriving theorems with a broad reach by starting from a specific set of assumptions (Van der
Sar, 2004). At the same time, the behavioral finance literature is expanding rapidly, and devia-
tions from the standard decision-making models are being classified into several broad categories
(Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). For instance, cross-sectional return predictability on the basis of
historical factors such as prior return performance and market capitalization is studied in sev-
eral theories, and is difficult to reconcile with the rational expectation hypothesis (Van der Sar,
2004).
Our aim in this thesis is to contribute to the literature by studying two specific fields within
behavioral finance, i.e. psychological biases, which can be observed in financial markets. These
are The Disposition Effect and Herding Behavior, and they will be presented as two separate
papers related to the Norwegian stock market.
The disposition effect is a theory of a cognitive bias introduced in 1985 by Shefrin and Statman
as an extension of a broad psychological theory of decision-making under risk, called Prospect
Theory. The disposition effect postulates that investors avoid actions that will make them feel
regret and seek actions that will give them pride, and as a result they are predisposed to ride
losers too long and sell winners too early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Herd behavior, on the
other hand, transpires when individual investors make investment decisions based on the actions
of other investors, i.e. ’follow the crowd’, while ignoring pertinent information such as news or
financial reports (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000). By doing this, the investor can reduce emotional
reactions or feelings if the stock declines substantially in value, since a group of investors also
lost money on the bad investment. The disposition effect and herd behavior have in common
that they are partly based on investors aversion to regret.
This thesis will use theory and earlier empirical studies of the disposition effect and herding
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behavior on foreign stock markets as a foundation for similar empirical tests in the Norwegian
stock market. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine these two theories over the specific
time period in Norway. The contribution of this thesis is thus to extend the existing literature
on investor behavior by including evidence from the Norwegian Equity Market.
In the disposition effect paper, stock market data for the thirty smallest firms by equity value as
of January 2014 is collected over a period of three years, and the methodology employed on the
data examines the relationship between volume at a given point in time, and volume that took
place in the past at different stock price levels. In the second paper focusing on herd behavior,
multiple data sets are collected covering various stock categories and time periods, where the
focus is particularly on firm size, market sectors and the financial crisis. The main part of the
herd behavior paper uses a model that analyses the relationship between cross-sectional absolute
deviations of asset returns and the corresponding market returns, while the final part combines
the volume perspective from the disposition effect paper with relevant assumptions for detecting
herd behavior.
Examination of investor behavior based on behavioral finance can grant investors a higher de-
gree of understanding regarding price and volume information in financial markets. A study
of investor behavior in Norway is important as share prices and volumes are substantially af-
fected by market participants’ investment behavior and thus can be linked to possible market
inefficiencies.
The thesis is divided into two papers, presenting the studies of the disposition effect and herd
behavior respectively. Each paper is separated into relevant sections and undersections, which
introduces each field, describes the theory and empirical methodologies in detail and presents
the results. Both papers also include a separate conclusion, before the main conclusion of the
thesis and recommendations for future work is presented in the end.
4 THE DISPOSITION EFFECT
Paper 1:
The Disposition Effect
in the Norwegian Equity Market
5Abstract
In this paper, the disposition effect in the Norwegian equity market is examined.
This is done by the application of prices and turnover for the thirty smallest firms
by equity value on Oslo stock exchange as of January 2014, from January 2010 to
December 2013. We apply a methodology which examines the correlation between
volume at a given point in time and volume that took place in the past at different
stock price levels, where the focus is specifically on abnormal turnover defined as
the portion of a firm’s trading volume that cannot be explained by common market
influences.
The results from the empirical analysis present evidence of the disposition effect in
some return intervals. When studying daily values, the disposition effect is more
visible in December than January, and observed deviations can be a result of tax-
loss selling. Monthly values for the entire year are also investigated in the analysis,
providing no significant evidence of the disposition effect, with February being an ex-
ception. The scattered result can be a result of a dilution of the disposition effect by
momentum strategy traders. When focusing on the returns closest to the investors’
reference points, the disposition effect becomes more visible. In summary, the evi-
dence suggests that the disposition effect is not an important factor in determining
equity returns and volumes in the Norwegian market.
6 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Traditional financial theory has a tendency to concentrate on how asset prices are de-
termined using models based on rationality, and thereby ignore the question of how investors
actually behave (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). The expected utility theory is a well-known ex-
ample, as it presents principles of rational choice with strong normative appeal, but with serious
limitations as a predictive device of investor behavior (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982). That is, clas-
sic economic theories assume that the relevant agents to a problem act (on average) according
to a normative solution to a problem, while Thaler (1980), among others, argue that descriptive
models for the experts are quite different from the models for the novice or intermediate. While
expected utility theory tries to characterize optimal behavior, other theories have been proposed
in later years which aim to solely describe or predict behavior.
Serious questioning of modern finance as a paradigm started when Prospect Theory, introduced
in 1979 by Kahneman and Tversky, was imported into studies of asset pricing, describing sev-
eral departures from the expected utility maximization upon which modern finance has been
based (Frankfurter and McGoun, 2002). The theory predicts "normatively unacceptable con-
sequences", and is thus a prescriptive study of preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Prospect theory, and similar theories, presents challenges to the theory of rational choice, be-
cause it is often far from clear whether the observed investor behavior should be treated as errors
or biases, or whether it should be accepted as valid elements of human choice (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982).
One of the main features of prospect theory is that it has a value function defined on gains and
losses relative to a reference point, i.e. it focuses on changes in wealth rather than the level
of wealth (Ritter, 2003). In 1985, the theory was extended into a wider theoretical framework
by Shefrin and Statman (1985) called The Disposition Effect, and this effect has eventually
become part of the general folklore about investing (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). The disposition
effect theory studies the implications of prospect theory in real financial markets, and combines
it with other behavioral finance theories such as The Theory of Regret, Mental Accounting
and Overconfidence (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). For instance, if investors are faced with the
possibility of losing money, they often take on riskier decisions due to loss aversion to avoid the
regret of having made a bad investment choice (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000).
According to Shefrin and Statman (1985), investors exhibit a disposition to sell winners too early
and ride losers too long, i.e. they time the realization of gains differently from the realization of
losses. Van der Sar (2004) suggests that "the occurrence of the disposition effect can demonstrate
that what a security has done may be more important for the choice to sell or to hold than what
it is likely to do". That is, the disposition effect is an implication of prospect theory, where
traders will lock in gains by closing out profitable investments quickly, while holding on to
losing investment in hopes that they will turn around (Bloomfield, 2006).
In relation to financial markets, it can be assumed that the disposition effect affects trading
volumes, because the number of shares sold will be larger for winning assets than for losing
assets (Camerer and Weber, 1998). In addition, the disposition effect might drive short-term
momentum, as the tendency to hold losers slows reactions to bad news, while a rapid selling
of winners slows reactions to good news (Bloomfield, 2006). That is, the rate at which private
information on a stock is incorporated into prices is delayed (Odean, 1998).
The main purpose of this paper is to use theory on the disposition effect and earlier empirical
methodology from foreign stock markets as a foundation for an empirical test of the disposition
effect in the Norwegian stock market. A similar test of Norway is performed by Nygaard (2011),
but while he uses an accounts dataset of household investors, this paper will focus on the smallest
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capitalization stocks on the stock market.
The empirical analysis will use stock market data for the thirty smallest firms by equity value
as of January 2014. The data period is from January 2010 to December 2013, and data is
collected from the Oslo stock exchange. The model that will be used to detect the disposition
effect in Norway was originally formulated by Ferris et al. (1987), who performed the analysis
on US stocks in 1988. In short, the methodology examines the relationship between volume at
a given point in time, and volume that took place in the past at different stock price levels. In
particular, volume levels at previous price levels are taken into account in predicting the level
of abnormal volume at a given point in time.
The test for disposition effect in Norway will be performed over the entire year, with specific
focus on December and January. This is done to account for the tax-loss-selling hypothesis,
which has competing implications for the stock market in December. That is, according to
the tax-loss-selling hypothesis, the volume of trading in stocks with capital losses will exceed
the volume of stocks with capital gains in December (Ferris et al., 1987). In January on the
other hand, the disposition effect and the tax-loss-selling hypothesis predicts the same trading
pattern.
The next two sections of this paper, section 2 and 3, review previous literature concerning
the disposition effect. In section 2, the underlying behavior finance phenomena related to the
disposition effect are described, as well as factors in financial markets that can be misinterpreted
as the disposition effect. Section 3 presents different elements in markets that can affect the
measurement of the disposition effect, and counter-effects working against the empirical evidence.
In section 4, the methodology and data used in the empirical analysis is described, and in section
5 the results are presented and discussed. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
8 THE DISPOSITION EFFECT
2 The Disposition Effect
In 1985 Shefrin and Statman introduced a wide theoretical framework called The Disposition
Effect. The theory concerns a general disposition to hold losers too long and sell winners
too quickly, and it has eventually become a fundamental feature in behavioral finance and
one of the most robust facts about the trading of investors (Barberis and Xiong, 2009). The
disposition effect was originally presented as an extension of Prospect Theory, introduced a
decade earlier by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), by placing its features into a broader scope.
More specifically, the disposition effect also includes some other behavioral elements that support
the main hypothesis of realizing winners too early and keeping losers too long, such as Regret
Aversion, Mental Accounting and Overconfidence. In addition, the framework involves a study
of real-world financial markets that ascertains if the disposition effect can be detected in actual
trading (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). According to Ferris et al. (1987), investors affected by the
disposition effect are eager to realize stocks with gains, but reluctant to realize stocks having
losses. That is, they seek risk when faced with losses and avoid risk for certain gains (Camerer
and Weber, 1998). Shefrin and Statman (1985), Barberis and Xiong (2009), Ferris et al. (1987)
and Dhar and Zhou (2006) among others, have tried to determine whether this assumption
holds, even when the perceptions of standard rational theory predicts otherwise, and it is one of
the most widely documented biases in investor behavior (Dhar and Zhou, 2006). In particular,
the disposition effect investor-type holds more shares than his rational counterpart in the case
of a paper capital loss, and less shares in the case of a capital gain (Grinblatt and Han, 2002).
Shefrin and Statman (1985) remark that while the standard neoclassical framework of utility is
prescriptive, the disposition effect hypothesis should be understood as being descriptive (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985).
Since the disposition effect is founded on the main elements of prospect theory, the first part
of this section will look deeper into the underlying assumptions of this theory. In addition,
the other behavioral finance elements that are strongly linked to the disposition effect will be
described, namely The Theory of Regret, Mental Accounting and Overconfidence. Thereafter,
other explanations of the observed trading pattern identified as the disposition effect is reported,
such as a belief in mean reversion.
2.1 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory was introduced in 1979 by Kahneman and Tversky as an alternative descriptive
model to expected utility theory, which until then had dominated the analysis of decision making
under risk. The central idea of utility theory is that each outcome of a decision gives rise to a
particular utility, and that utility is not necessarily a linear function of outcomes (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982). In addition, the traditional utility literature assumes that people behave as
rational expected utility maximizers (Shapira and Venezia, 2001). In their article, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) claim that utility theory, being a normative model of rational choice, is
not an adequate descriptive model of economic behavior under risk. The model might describe
how consumers should choose, but it does not necessarily describe how they actually do choose
(Thaler, 1980).
A central concept in both utility theory and prospect theory is that the highest monetary
expectation does not always correspond to the highest expected utility (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present in their study results where over half of
the respondent’s preferences systematically violated the axioms of expected utility theory. As a
matter of fact, the observed violations of conventional expected utility theory are neither small-
scale or randomly distributed, indicating that people’s choices are affected by factors that are
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mis-specified by conventional theory (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982). Thaler (1980) argues that the
rational economic model of consumer behavior does a poor job of predicting the behavior of the
average consumer, as it is, in essence, a model of robot-like experts ignoring rules-of-thumb and
heuristics. Prospect theory, on the other hand, attempts to take into account a very complex
and demanding world for human decision makers (Thaler, 1980).
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), decision-making under risk can be viewed as a
choice between prospects, and if the decision maker does not discover that his preferences vio-
late the decision rules he wishes to obey, several anomalies discovered in the financial markets
are expected to occur. Thus, mental illusions should be considered the rule, rather than the ex-
ception (Thaler, 1980). In prospect theory, the value of each outcome of a decision is multiplied
by a decision weight that is usually a function of stated probability, but which can be influenced
by other factors as well.
2.1.1 Gains and Losses, and the use of a Reference Point
The cornerstone of prospect theory is that people perceive outcomes from choices as gains and
losses, i.e. changes of wealth, rather than as final states of wealth (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). This way of thinking is a deviation from the original assumption where utilities are
assigned to final-asset positions, and was originally proposed by Markowitz in 1952. Markowitz
argues that both rich and poor people will behave essentially the same when taking chances of a
small loss for a small chance of a larger gain, only differentiating in their interpretation of ’large’
and ’small’.
In prospect theory, the initial asset position usually serves as a reference point for the definition
of gains and losses, implying that the location of this point is of great importance for the
analysis (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Specifically, the reference point depends not only on
current wealth, but also on impressions, judgments and responses, making it a “ubiquitous
psychological phenomenon” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As a consequence, according to
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the value of a particular change is a function of two arguments:
the reference point and the magnitude of the change from that reference point. The result is that
people usually adapt to a limited view of the outcomes of decisions (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982).
It is important to note that the formulation of prospects and the expectations of the decision
maker can affect the location of the reference point. For instance, a tendency called the ‘isolation
effect’, where people discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration,
can lead to inconsistent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In addition, a fixation on
specific factors, e.g. stock prices, is a specific behavioral phenomenon called ’anchoring’ (Baker
and Nofsinger, 2002). This makes the presentation of choices a critical factor in decision analysis,
since a change in the reference point can alter the preference order for prospects (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
2.1.2 Risk Aversion versus Risk-Seeking behavior
Observed behavior and experimental studies, for instance by Kahneman and Tversky ((1979),
(1982)), Odean (1998) and Camerer and Weber (1998), indicate that people are risk averse in
choices involving sure gains, and risk seeking in choices involving sure losses, a feature that is
inconsistent with utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Thus, there is an impressive
amount of evidence that risk attitudes depend on the reference point. In the case of a gain,
each extra dollar gained adds less value than the preceding one, favoring risk aversion. The case
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is similar for losses, where each dollar lost causes a smaller change in value than the preceding
one, and in this case the result is a risk-seeking preference (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). The
exception is in cases involving very small probabilities (Thaler, 1980).
Another property of prospect theory is that when it comes to attitudes towards changes in
welfare, losses seem to loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). This means
that the pleasure associated with gaining a sum of money appears to be less influencing than
the aggravation experienced in losing the same amount (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For
instance, Shefrin and Statman (1984) note in their study that this behavior is consistent with
the observation that announced increases in dividends have a much less evident effect on market
value than do announced dividends decreases. The difference between gains and losses can
also explain why out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs are not treated equivalently, which
they should according to rational theory. Opportunity costs are underweighted because they
are treated as foregone gains, while out-of-pocket costs are viewed as losses and are thus more
heavily weighted (Thaler, 1980). This illustrates how the structure of a problem may affect
choices, even if the outcomes are identical when evaluated with respect to final asset positions
(Thaler, 1980).
2.1.3 The Value Function
As a consequence of the observed behavior described above, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
present a new version of the value function, which associates a subjective value to any amount
that is gained or lost. To account for the definition of gains and losses, the value function is
defined on deviations from the reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Risk seeking in
the negative domain below the reference point is accompanied by risk aversion in the positive
domain above, and the curvature of the function relates subjective values to objective outcomes
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Gains are represented in the positive domain, where the value
function is concave and progressively flatter as the amount of the gain is increased, i.e. a
shape that favors risk aversion. Similarly, losses are represented in the negative domain by a
convex function favoring risk-seeking behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). The shape of
the function is similar to that presented by Markowitz (1952), but his function had concave and
convex regions in both regions of the value function (Shefrin and Statman, 1984).
Another feature of the value function illustrates the asymmetry in the response to losses com-
pared to gains, i.e. that losses have a larger subjective effect, by a greater steepness in the graph
in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). By combining these properties, decision
makers employ and behave as if maximizing a value function that is S-shaped, having a steeper
graph on the loss side implying that people are generally risk-averse (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). An illustration of a hypothetical value function is shown in Figure 2.1.
If a person’s preferences instead follow the axioms from utility theory, that is, decisions are
formulated in terms of final assets, the reference point will be shifted to zero and the value
function will probably be concave everywhere. This eliminates risk-seeking behavior (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) also remark that the described pattern
doesn’t always prevail in the cases of low probabilities, because they are commonly overweighed
relative to certainty. The probability weighting function in prospect theory takes care of this
feature by overweighting low probabilities and thus “parsimoniously captures the simultaneous
demand many individuals have for both lottery tickets and insurance” (Barberis and Xiong,
2009).
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Figure 2.1: Hypothetical value function
2.1.4 Risk Aversion
As noted earlier, in relation to the value function, risk aversion is equivalent to a concave func-
tion and is related to the realization of gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In particular, a
person is risk averse if a certain prospect is preferred over any risky prospect (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) point out that the difference between possibility
and impossibility, and between possibility and certainty is more significant than comparable
differences in intervening probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explain this behavior
by a tendency called the ‘certainty effect’, where people underweight outcomes that are merely
probable and overweight outcomes that are considered certain. In particular, risk-averse decision
makers usually prefer a certain gain even if the possible gamble has a higher ‘monetary expec-
tation’, and thus choose a risky venture only when the monetary expectation is sufficiently high
to compensate for the risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). This implies that prospect theory
would make a risk-averse individual pay more for the complete elimination of uncertainty than
his risk attitude alone would indicate (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). In contrast, when decision
makers must choose between a sure loss and a probability of a large loss, they demonstrate
risk-seeking preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).
2.2 The Theory of Regret
Regret theory is a model of choice under uncertainty that is strongly linked to prospect theory
and the disposition effect, due to the concept of regret aversion. Loomes and Sudgen (1982)
proposed the theory in 1982 as an alternative theory to prospect theory, in the light of the
accumulated evidence showing consistent violations of certain axioms of expected utility theory.
They remark that regret theory has a remarkably simple structure compared to prospect theory,
while it still maintains predictive power and generality by supporting experimental evidence
and having a greater appeal to intuition. The two fundamental assumptions of regret theory
are: (1) many people experience regret, and (2) they try to anticipate and take account of this
sensation when making decisions under uncertainty (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982). In particular, it
is assumed that individuals have a ‘choiceless utility function’, which is essentially what Bernoulli
understood by ‘utility’ (psychological experience associated with the satisfaction of desire), and a
‘modified utility function’ which incorporates the increment or decrement of utility corresponding
with the sensation of rejoicing or regret (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982). Consequently, the degree
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of regret depends on the difference between the choiceless utility of ‘what is’ and the choiceless
utility of ‘what might have been’. The individual’s experience of rejoicing or regret is thus a
result of an act of choice, and someone who does not feel regret will simply maximize expected
choiceless utility (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982).
It is worth noting that Loomes and Sudgen (1982) argue that regret theory is a model of rational
choice under uncertainty, as they define the explained behavior as being both predictable and
rational. They believe that people who experience regret and who seek to maximize expected
modified utility by taking those feelings into account do not behave, in any meaningful sense of
the word, irrational – even when the regret theory predicts certain violations of conventional ex-
pected utility theory. According to Loomes and Sudgen (1982), it is rather that the conventional
axioms represent an unnecessarily restrictive definition of rationality. In addition, the experience
of regret is just an experience, and cannot properly be described in terms of rationality in the
same way as concrete choices (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982). However, Loomes and Sudgen (1982)
note that regret theory cannot explain all of the behavioral regularities revealed by experimental
research, e.g. by Kahneman and Tversky, into choice under uncertainty.
In prospect theory, regret can be modelled through induced changes in the reference point
(Thaler, 1980). According to Shefrin and Statman (1985), aversion to regret is an important
explanation to why many investors find it difficult to realize losses, because the very act of
doing so is evidence of a wrong judgment in the past. The positive counterpart to regret is
pride, induced when investors close a stock account at a gain, but if the stock continues to rise
the feeling of pride is reduced by the regret of having sold to quickly (Shefrin and Statman,
1985).
Odean (1998) also discovers that investors are most reluctant to realize their greatest losses
and suggests that it is due to regret aversion. Equivalently, investors’ aversion to regret may
influence them not to buy additional shares of big winners, as the potential regret becomes
greater by the difference between the original and additional purchase price (Odean, 1998). An
example is presented by Shefrin and Statman (1984) for the case of choosing between the use of
dividends or gains from sold stocks to buy a television. According to financial theory, dividends
and receipts from selling a stock are perfect substitutes, but evidence indicates that the sale
of stocks causes more regret and therefore regret-averse investors will prefer consumption from
dividends (Shefrin and Statman, 1984).
2.2.1 Taking Responsibility of an Action
As noted earlier, Loomes and Sudgen (1982) suggest that regret is mainly a result of an act
of choice. Therefore, a particular feature of regret theory is that the regret associated with an
action (such as buying a losing stock) tends to be more intense than regret from inaction or a
missed opportunity (such as not buying a winning stock) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As a
result, the prospect theory value function changes when an individual feels responsible for the
outcome of a gamble: A gain leads to an extra value stemming from pride, while a loss leads to
a stronger sense of regret and less value (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). Therefore, Thaler (1980)
proposes that the possibility of regret makes individuals reluctant to make decisions in which
they feel responsible for the final outcome. This can be used to relate regret theory to the formal
analysis of prospect theory, as it is easier to mentally delete an event from a chain of occurrences
than to insert an event to the chain, i.e. it is easier to imagine not taking an action than to
imagine taking one (Shefrin and Statman, 1984).
Making a choice becomes a special kind of decision-making cost which can be reduced by avoiding
trades where the outcomes can cause regret (Thaler, 1980). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) thus
claim that actions taken under restrictions or by following conventional rules generate less regret
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than when losses have occurred by making unconventional and innovative choices. The wish to
avoid regret from selling a stock can for instance explain why some investors would be willing
to pay a premium for cash dividends (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). Still, Shefrin and Statman
(1984) point out that a decision involving responsibility will sometimes be preferred, since the
odds attached to the gamble must be taken into account.
In their experimental study, Camerer and Weber (1998) separate between deliberate selling and
automatic selling, the last being the case where shares are automatically sold after each period
and subjects have to rebuy them (at the same price). They discover that the disposition effect is
greatly reduced in the ‘automatic selling’ condition, which is in contrast with rational thinking
where a decision maker should behave identically in both conditions (given no transaction costs).
Subjects who must sell assets deliberately exhibit greater disposition effect because they have a
reluctance to incur losses and thus “blow out the flame of hope with their own breath” (Camerer
and Weber, 1998).
2.3 Mental Accounting
Grinblatt and Han (2005) suggest that the leading explanation for the disposition effect is
prospect theory combined with a behavioral phenomenon known as ‘mental accounting’. The
framework of mental accounting was constructed by Thaler (1985) as a foundation for the
way decision-makers frame decisions. Thaler (1985) developed the model using a hybrid of
cognitive psychology and microeconomics, and suggests that a mental accounting system induces
individuals to violate simple economic principles. Accordingly, decision-makers tend to segregate
the different types of decisions into separate mental accounts, before applying prospect theoretic
decision rules to each account separately, ignoring possible interactions. In the world of finance,
a new mental account is opened when a stock is purchased, and the asset purchase price serves
as a reference point for indicating gains and losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). In addition,
the normative principle of fungibility, where money is not supposed to have labels attached,
is relaxed in the mental accounting framework (Thaler, 1985). Consequently, even when an
investor trades several stocks, he receives a separate component of utility from the trading profit
of each stock (Barberis and Xiong, 2009). This sort of sequential analysis seems to be a good
description of behavior (Thaler, 1985).
As shares are exchanged between investors, the reference point is updated (Grinblatt and Han,
2005). Thus, an investor’s behavior is altered by his current position in wealth, not by either his
lifetime winnings or losing nor by some event allocated to a different account altogether such as
an increase in salary (Thaler, 1985). By using a reference point, the theory also capture ’mere’
framing effects that affect choices, since choices often depend on the way a problem is posed as
much as on the objective features of the problem (Thaler, 1985). In addition, the loss aversion
feature can illustrate mental accounting, since one of the major obstacles standing in the way
of loss realization of a particular investment is the reluctance to close a mental account at a loss
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985).
Thaler (1985) investigates values of outcomes, and specifically whether jointly or separate val-
uation of gains and losses produces greater utility, referred to as integration or segregation of
outcomes. He presents four principles: segregate gains, integrate losses, cancel losses against
larger gains and segregate ’silver linings’ (losses and gains of similar amounts). In the case of
gains, it is desirable to have each gain evaluated separately, and in the case of losses the concav-
ity of the loss function implies that adding a loss to an existing loss will have smaller impact.
In fact, mental accounting can be regarded as part of an individual’s solution to self-control
problems.
Barberis and Xiong (2009) also suggests that mental accounting can explain why investors are
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reluctant to immediately transfer the proceeds from selling a stock to another similar stock
(called ’tax swaps’). In theory, loss aversion from selling a losing stock could be reconciled by a
purchase of a stock with similar characteristics, so that a tax loss could be realized while the risk
exposure is maintained. However, since the stocks are segregated into separate mental accounts,
such a tax swap requires that one mental account is closed at a loss, which people are reluctant
to do (Odean, 1998).
2.4 Overconfidence
Ben-David and Doukas (2006) study the mechanism that links investor overconfidence to the
disposition effect, with focus on institutional investors. They point out that this analysis is
important not only because of the relative economic importance of institutional investors1, but
also because they are believed to be immune to behavioral biases and motivated by incentives
and agency motives. Ben-David and Doukas (2006) document that institutional investors show
signs of overconfident trading when stocks have ambiguous information, and as a result exhibit
greater disposition effect. The explanation, according to Ben-David and Doukas (2006), is
that overconfidence leads professional investors to overestimate the precision of their private
information signals and update their beliefs asymmetrically between favorable and unfavorable
signals: Price increases are interpreted as confirmation of beliefs, leading investors to sell shares
as they believe their valuation has been fully incorporated in the market, while price decreases are
discounted, leading investors to hold on to their shares as they believe other market participants
have not realized the true valuation yet (Ben-David and Doukas, 2006).
The overestimation of information precision also leads to intensified differences in opinion among
investors, which, in turn, causes trading. Consequently, investor overconfidence generates the
high trading volume observed in financial markets, and it encourages investors to trade asym-
metrically between gains and losses (Ben-David and Doukas, 2006). In addition, Ben-David and
Doukas (2006) note that the disposition effect intensifies with information ambiguity2, as it elic-
its investor overconfidence. This also indicates that when information ambiguity is low, investors
accept the market’s valuation less reluctantly, and thus put more weight on the public valuation
signal and sell more loser stocks to cut losses. Still, it is worth noting that institutional investors
might condition their trading decisions on past performance because of institutional character-
istics and constraints unrelated to overconfidence. The asymmetry in trading gains and losses
can for instance be due to institutional explicit and implicit compensation structures, agency
issues (known as window dressing), rebalancing considerations, stock liquidity, transaction costs
and sensitivity to taxes (Ben-David and Doukas, 2006).
2.5 Other Phenomena explaining the Disposition Effect
As mentioned earlier, evidence of the disposition effect is found in several studies. However, it
is worth noting that the observed trading pattern, i.e. holding on to losers and selling winners,
may have other behavioral or rational explanations. This section briefly describes some of
them.
1Institutional investors represent the largest class of investors in the marketplace (Ben-David and Doukas,
2006).
2Here, information ambiguity is meant in the sense of parameter uncertainty.
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2.5.1 A belief in Mean Reversion
Prospect theory is not the only possible explanation for the observed fact that investors sell
shares after they rise and keep them if they fall. One hypothesis is based on informed trading,
namely that investors may sell a winning stock believing that its price reflects the favorable
information they had when buying, or hold a depreciating stock rationally believing that the
market has not yet incorporated their information into price (Odean, 1998). This hypothesis
is incompatible with the momentum effect, which is empirically documented by Odean (1998),
and thus the investors are on average mistaken. Still, the disposition effect can be a result of an
irrational belief in short-term mean reversion where investors misperceive probabilities of future
change (Odean, 1998).
In general, it can be difficult to make a clear distinction between prospect theory and a belief in
mean reversion when testing for the disposition effect, and it may be that investors themselves
do not always separate them; an investor holding on to a losing stock might convince himself
that the stock will mean revert rather than admit an aversion to realize a loss (Odean, 1998). It
can be noted that mean reversion also applies to stocks that an investors does not already own,
implying that investors believing in mean reversion will tend to buy stocks that have previously
declined (Odean, 1998). While the disposition effect only predicts variation in the number of
shares sold, the experiments performed by Camerer and Weber (1998) allow them to investigate
how stock price movements affect buying behavior. Results from their design indicate that if
subjects buy stocks expecting mean-reversion, their belief is wrong because price changes across
all stock were actually positively autocorrelated.
According to De Bondt and Thaler (1985), a contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling
past winners will achieve abnormal returns because individuals tend to overreact to information,
but Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that their evidence can be explained by systematic risk
of the contrarian portfolios and the size effect. In addition, significant abnormal returns, i.e.
apparent success of contrarian strategies, due short-term return reversals may reflect a lack of
liquidity, a lead-lag effect, rather than overreaction. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) presents
evidence that the profits can be attributed to delayed stock price reactions to firm-specific
information, implying that the market is inefficient.
2.5.2 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD)
Frazzini (2006) study the effect of corporate news announcement on stock prices, based on
the observed fact that prices subsequent to positive news often show positive abnormal drift
and that negative news generate negative market reactions followed by negative drift, since no
unified rational or irrational explanation has won general acceptance. According to Frazzini,
investors who display the disposition effect can generate this post-earnings announcement drift
(PEAD) anomaly as a result of stock price ‘underreaction’: The investors want to lock in the
paper gain for a stock that increases in value following good news, which depresses its price, and
they are reluctant to sell a stock that decreases following bad news so that any trading occur
at a temporarily inflated price. Consequently, disposition investors tend to generate return
continuation by dampening the transmission of information (Frazzini, 2006). Positive (negative)
news travels slowly across assets trading at large capital gains (losses), which generates positive
(negative) post-event return predictability (Frazzini, 2006).
Frazzini (2006) remarks that the price drift depends on the news content (i.e. if it is positive
or negative) and the difference between the current price and the reference price. In particular,
the disposition effect makes a scenario-specific prediction about the sign of the underreaction
pattern: The post-announcement drift following earnings surprises is significantly higher when
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the news and capital gains overhang have the same sign, and its magnitude is directly related to
the amount of unrealized gains or losses (Frazzini, 2006). Finally, Frazzini (2006) notes that there
are alternative explanations to the observed underreaction, for instance that some stocks have
“loyal” holders who sell rarely, or that some stocks have low turnover and are generally illiquid
(overhang is negatively correlated with turnover). However, none of the illiquidity factors can
explain the asymmetry in the price response – i.e. that there are different directions for positive
and negative news – which is consistent with the disposition effect (Frazzini, 2006).
2.5.3 Other Explanations
Barber and Odean (2000) presents evidence that individual investors trade too frequently, even
when it is costly, and some of this trading has been explained by the disposition to sell winners.
However, excess trading that is categorized under the disposition effect can be due to statistical
artifacts or have other explanations, and there are often competing plausible hypotheses to
explain it (Camerer and Weber, 1998). One of them is the belief in mean-reversion explained
above, and others are presented in this section.
The first hypothesis is that the disposition effect is actually an instance of portfolio rebalancing
(Barberis and Xiong, 2009). Investors may sell some appreciated stock after large price increases
to restore diversification in their portfolios (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986). However, Odean
(1998) casts doubt on this explanation for two reasons: (i) rebalancing is usually a partial change
of a stock position, so that investors who are rebalancing will usually only sell a portion of their
stock position; still, the disposition effect remains strong even when their study is restricted to
sales of entire stock holdings and (ii) the disposition effect is exhibited more strongly among less
sophisticated investors, which is a contradiction if rebalancing is the most tactical thing to do
(Barberis and Xiong, 2009).
Investors’ reticence to sell losers may also be explained by transaction costs. This is because
trading costs tend to be higher for lower priced stocks, and losing investment are more likely to
be lower priced than winning investments (Odean, 1998). In addition, Lakonishok and Smidt
(1986) suggest that professional managers who are compensated based on performance may
realize gains to ensure that they are not lost by subsequent market downturns, and similarly
that corporate investors time the realization of capital gains and losses so as to produce desirable
accounting results - so called “window dressing”.
The issues mentioned in this section are investigated by Odean (1998), among others, and his
results indicate that the most obvious explanations fail to capture important features of the
data. The disposition effect is still observed when the data is controlled for rebalancing and
share price, so the excess trading in markets appear not to be justified by portfolio rebalancing
or a desire to avoid high transaction costs (Odean, 1998).
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3 Measuring the Disposition Effect
The disposition effect is a behavioral phenomenon composed of the main features of prospect
theory, such as value being defined over gains and losses and the use of a reference point, and
other theories trying to explain the psychology of investors. The theory of regret, mental ac-
counting and overconfidence are all important contributors to the realization of the disposition
effect in stock markets. At the same time, empirical results identified as evidence of the dis-
position effect can in some cases be due to other market phenomena instead, such as portfolio
rebalancing, window dressing or belief in mean reversion. This makes it challenging to create a
precise measure of the disposition effect in real markets.
This section will present more elements that affect the measurement of the disposition effect in
stock markets. The first part describes how the choice of assumptions and data, such as annual
or realized values and investor types, can affect the significance of the disposition measure. In
addition, there exists several strategies in stock markets that operate in a direction contrary
to the disposition effect, and the second part of this section will look deeper into two of these
counter-effects: the momentum strategy and tax-loss-selling.
3.1 Factors affecting Empirical Analyses of the Disposition Effect
As mentioned earlier, the aversion to loss realization and quest for pride, together with an
asymmetry between the strength of pride and regret, leads to a S-shaped value function where
investors defer losses to postpone regret, and realize gains to hasten the feeling of pride (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985). In a financial setting, the stock’s purchase price is a natural reference point
for evaluating investment alternatives (Camerer and Weber, 1998). An appreciating stock will
move along the concave part of the value function, where it is sold if its expected return no
longer justifies the risk of the stock. Similarly, a decreasing stock will move to a more convex
part of the function, where it will be held by the investor even if its expected return falls below
a price that would justify the original purchase. In this case, to motivate the sale the investor
must lower his expected return further (Odean, 1998).
The implication of the disposition effect is that some investors sell good-performing stocks that
often continue to do well, and keep poor performing stocks, perhaps even investing more in them,
that continue to perform poorly (Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). The result is that trading volume
tends to grow during a bull market, and tends to fall if the market turns (Ritter, 2003).3 Camerer
and Weber (1998) explore the case where investors adjust their reference points according to
stock price changes and thus evaluate gains and losses with the current price being the reference
point. They argue that in such a case there should be no disposition effect, because a loss
averse investor will always sell for equal chance gambles, i.e. winners and losers will be treated
identically (Camerer and Weber, 1998). Thus, according to Camerer and Weber (1998), the
disposition effect will only arise when the reference point is a price of a previous period and when
investors show prospect theoretic risk preferences. Therefore, it is obvious that the disposition
effect should not be present in an efficient market, as the weak form of the efficient market
hypothesis implies that past prices provide no information about future returns, since these past
prices paid have become sunk costs by the time of sale (Shapira and Venezia, 2001).
Odean (1998) notes that the disposition behavior of individual investors can affect market prices,
but that the extent depends on the trading activities of other market participants, so the eco-
nomic significance of the disposition effect is likely to be greatest for the individuals. At the
3As an example, trading volume in the Japanese stock market fell by over 80% from the late 1980s to the
mid-1990s (Ritter, 2003).
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same time, when substantial trading takes place, the disposition effect may contribute to mar-
ket stability around the current price, since this price becomes the investors’ reference point:
If the stock falls below the reference point, the supply of potential sellers is reduced, slowing
further price decreases, while if the stock rises the supply of sellers is increased, slowing further
price increases (Odean, 1998). Consequently, people tend to reverse or substantially alter their
revealed disposition toward risk if gains turn into losses or vice versa.
3.1.1 Annual versus Realized Gains and Losses
As noted earlier, prospect theory is a potentially important ingredient in a model of the dis-
position effect. While the link between them has been discussed informally in many articles,
Barberis and Xiong (2009) study in more detail under what conditions prospect theory predicts
a disposition effect, to formalize the link in a rigorous model. In particular, they find that there
are particular circumstances where the disposition effect does not seem to hold. They present
evidence that if the expected return of a stock is high, an investor with a function that is only
mildly concave in the region of gains will take a large gamble on the stock and thus take more
risk.
On the other hand, Barberis and Xiong (2009) argue that the disposition effect is relevant in the
cases when (i) there are many trading periods, (ii) expected stock return is low, which lowers the
risk-aversion to buy the stock, (iii) the degree of loss aversion is high, so that the investor takes
a less aggressive position in the risky asset, and (iv) the value function has increased concavity
for gains and convexity for losses, so that the investor takes a smaller position in gains and a
larger position in losses. Barberis and Xiong (2009) also distinguish between paper gains/losses
and realized gains/losses in relation to perceived utility, which are not considered different in
the traditional framework, and find that a model defining prospect theory over realized gains
and losses is more probable to find evidence of the disposition effect.
3.1.2 Differences across Individuals
As noted earlier, many studies of the disposition effect have been performed using field data,
and one of the most convincing is done by Odean (1998) who uses several different tests on large
samples from a large discount broker. However, even as the data comprise independence across
investors, the conclusions are based on aggregate results. According to Dhar and Zhou (2006),
using aggregate data across all traders to arrive at a mean disposition effect is not entirely
representative for individual investors because of systematic differences in trading heuristics
across individuals. Odean (1998) also points out that cross-sectional variation will be concealed
by aggregate descriptions of average investors, in particular because the realized gains of one
investor does not necessarily correspond to the proportion of losses realized for the same investor.
Consequently, idiosyncratic differences between each individual investor are not captured and no
direct insights into individuals decision-making processes is offered (Camerer and Weber, 1998).
Accordingly, Dhar and Zhou (2006) suggest that there is a wide dispersion in the disposition bias
across individuals, and explain this in terms of underlying investor characteristics. Specifically,
they study if trading frequency and different investors’ literacy about financial markets can be
possible explanations of the variation in individual disposition effect, and their results show that
trading frequency, high income and/or a high occupational status tends to reduce the bias.
The reason why wealthier individuals who work in professional occupations exhibit significantly
smaller disposition effect, is that such demographic characteristics are correlated with better
access to information, an understanding of stock investments and/or access to financial advice
(regardless of education and knowledge) (Dhar and Zhou, 2006). Shapira and Venezia (2001)
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also analyze the difference between individual and professional investors with the argument
that accepted financial theories predict that markets are mainly driven by decisions made by
professionals who are, it is argued, likely to be rational. They find that the disposition effect is
stronger for the individual investors, but that also professional investors exhibit the effect. In
addition, they confirm the result of Dhar and Zhou (2006), namely that the disposition effect is
significantly weaker in the managed group, indicating that professional training and experience
may reduce judgmental biases. In addition, the returns of the independent group were far more
correlated with the market than the returns of the managed group, indicating a tendency for
individuals to ’follow the herd’ rather than choosing stocks based on their merit (Shapira and
Venezia, 2001). Moreover, the managed portfolios were better diversified, thus appearing less
risky (Shapira and Venezia, 2001). In general, a lack of knowledge about investment valuation
usually leads to a reliance on the price paid as inferring value and a belief that past prices affect
future returns (Dhar and Zhou, 2006). Even if ‘cognitive illusions’, such as the reference point
effect, are not easy to eliminate through learning, awareness of these illusions and consequences
of decisions can lead to behavior modification (Dhar and Zhou, 2006).
The consequences of Dhar and Zhou’s (2006) evidence is that less sophisticated investors (in
the market sense) having higher disposition effect will experience lower after-tax returns than
what they could possibly obtain. A possibility for amateur investors is to become a client of a
professional trader, and thus face a trade-off between the superior knowledge and expertise of
the professional, and the possible payment for unnecessary transactions (Shapira and Venezia,
2001). In addition, Shapira and Venezia (2001) suggest that market models could be extended
to include investors with varying degrees of biases or information, not only general rational and
irrational (noise) traders.
The conclusion of Dhar and Zhou (2006) and Shapira and Venezia (2001) is in contrast with the
results of Ben-David and Doukas (2006) in the earlier section describing overconfidence, since
Ben-David and Doukas indicate in their article that institutional investors’ overconfidence is a
driver of the disposition effect as it leads them to prefer trading past winners to past losers.
At the same time, Ben-David and Doukas point out that the predictive power of prospect
theory relies on an appropriate assumption about the reference price, implying that tests for
the disposition effect are tests of joint hypothesis of both risk preferences and reference price.
Therefore, they find that institutional investors do not exhibit the disposition effect on average
when the historic purchase price of stocks is used as the reference for calculation of gains and
losses, but that they seem to be reluctant to sell losers when the ever-high price is set as a
reference. Thus, Institutional investors are reluctant to sell stock after prices have decreased
from the peak level (Ben-David and Doukas, 2006).
3.1.3 Trading Frequency
Another feature of the aggregated mean method is that more weight is assigned to frequent
traders, and Dhar and Zhou (2006) find a negative relationship between trading frequency and
the magnitude of the disposition effect. A reason for this can be that frequent traders have a
greater understanding of the role of market forces in setting stock prices, and consequently have
a better appreciation for the concept of market efficiency, leading them to adjust the reference
point in direction of the current price and thus to a smaller disposition bias (Dhar and Zhou,
2006). Shapira and Venezia (2001) also discover that the number of transactions and turnover
rate indicate that professionals are significantly more active than the independent investors,
and they present several explanations: (i) professionals are more overconfident, (ii) professionals
want to signal that they are doing some work to preserve their jobs, (iii) professionals have lower
trading costs, and (iv) professionals hold a larger number of stocks. In any case, Shapira and
Venezia (2001) find that the annualized overall returns of the managed group were significantly
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higher than those of the independent group and that it can specifically be attributable to the
managed accounts’ behavior in the losing transactions. Finally, Dhar and Zhou (2006) indicate
that some of the anomalies in markets can be alleviated by an increased trading frequency,
but Barber and Odean (2000) discover in their study however, that trading is costly and thus
hazardous to investors wealth.
3.2 Counter-Effects
Some strategies suggest the opposite behavior of the disposition effect, namely to sell losers and
keep winners in order to earn profits. In this section, two of these strategies will be presented.
One of them is based on a belief in continuance of existing trends in the marked, and the other
is based on a rational consideration of tax issues.
3.2.1 Momentum Strategies
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) propose that profitable trading strategies that select stocks based
on their past returns will exist if stock prices either overreact or underreact to information,
and that the profitability of such strategies depends on the efficiency of the stock market. The
market is efficient if the profits of a strategy may be attributed to compensation for bearing
systematic risk, not to past prices (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
The disposition effect has been linked to pricing phenomena such as stock-level-momentum
(Barberis and Xiong, 2009). Grinblatt and Han (2002) explains momentum as the persistence in
stock returns over horizons between three months and one year. Disposition effect behavior can in
some ways be regarded as the opposite of a profitable momentum strategy, as a momentum trader
will take a long position in a stock with an upward trending price and vice versa. The momentum
strategy is based on the intuition that the relatively high returns experienced by some securities
can be expected to continue, since realized returns contain a component related to expected
returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Odean (1998) presents evidence that momentum trading
can be a profitable strategy, because the average returns of past winners often continue to be high
in subsequent periods. Consequently, if disposition prone investors hold on to losers believing
that they will outperform their winners in the future, they behave irrationally because persistent
evidence suggests otherwise (Odean, 1998). Similarly, they seem to have irrational beliefs when
they sell past winners, even if it is because they lower their estimate of the stocks expected
return, since the winners continue to outperform the losers they keep in subsequent months
(Barberis and Xiong, 2009).
At the same time, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find evidence that the long-term returns are
higher for the stock in the loser portfolio, revealing that the excess returns of past winners
dissipate over a longer-term horizon. Similarly, the flow of information over short horizons is
usually too small to generate large gains or losses across stocks (Grinblatt and Han, 2005). This
means that in a momentum strategy, it is most profitable to use intermediate horizon past returns
for portfolio formation (Grinblatt and Han, 2002). In addition, the reference point converges to
the market price faster the higher the turnover, as the recent updating of the reference prices
shifts the demand function closer to the rational benchmark in the subsequent round of trading
(Grinblatt and Han, 2005).
Grinblatt and Han (2002) propose that if some investors are subject to the disposition effect
and thus create a ‘capital gains overhang’ in the market, this can actually be the key variable
generating profitability for the momentum strategy. Trading that arise because of the disposition
effect may account for the tendency of past winning stocks to subsequently outperform past losing
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stocks, i.e. the correlation between past returns and variables, as stocks with large aggregate
unrealized capital gains tend to have higher expected return than stocks with large aggregate
unrealized losses (Grinblatt and Han, 2002). For instance, Grinblatt and Han (2005) find in their
empirical analysis that the return-based momentum effect disappears once the disposition effect
is controlled for. The disposition effect induces demand perturbation, because the demand is not
perfectly elastic when some investors have higher demand for losing stocks. Such interference
in otherwise rational demand functions has implications for equilibrium prices (Grinblatt and
Han, 2005). In particular, the disposition effect creates a spread between a stock’s fundamental
value and its market price, and a spread convergence implying that stocks with large past price
increases have higher expected returns. A momentum strategy makes use of this spread and the
succeeding predictable prices, to generate profits that depend on the path of past stock prices
(Grinblatt and Han, 2002). Grinblatt and Han (2002) therefore suggest that as the number of
disposition agents is reduced, the fundamental value will converge to the equilibrium market
price.
As the disposition demand is determined by the future realization of the fundamental value,
there is no way to anticipate the demand in advance, so to prevent the model from collapsing
rational agents must have some degree of risk aversion (Grinblatt and Han, 2002). Moreover,
even when fully rational arbitrageurs have full knowledge of the existence of disposition investors,
they will not eliminate the impact on the equilibrium as they cannot ascertain when reference
prices, and hence market prices, will converge to fundamental values (Grinblatt and Han, 2005).
In addition, the trading done by rational arbitrageurs will be restrained by limited capital or
incomplete information, or they rather anticipate the impact of positive feedback traders on
demand and thus further destabilize prices by front-running them instead of bringing the prices
in line with fundamental values (Grinblatt and Han, 2005).
3.2.2 Tax Considerations
Tax considerations have in some cases been used to explain the unaccountable high trading
volume that is observed in financial markets (e.g. Barber and Odean (2000)). It is well known
that gains and losses are taxed when the investor sells the stock, not when gains and losses
actually occur (Constantinides, 1984). Therefore, taxable investors have an incentive to real-
ize losses and, according to the prevailing view, should avoid realizing gains (Lakonishok and
Smidt, 1986). According to Constantinides (1984), the optimal strategy for tax reasons and zero
transaction costs is to: (1) defer realization of short-term capital gains and (2) realize a capital
loss and repurchase the stock.
The tax-loss selling hypothesis predicts a greater propensity to hold profitable investments to
postpone taxable gains, and to sell stocks with losses because the realized losses can offset taxable
gains in other assets (Barberis and Xiong, 2009). In contrast, the disposition effect proposes the
opposite behavior, namely that people has a reluctance to realize losses and thus act as if they
are trying to maximize their taxes (Ritter, 2003). Consequently, for taxable investments the
disposition effect is suboptimal, being at odds with optimal tax-loss selling, and predicting that
people behave differently than if they paid attention to tax consequences (Odean, 1998).
Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) study the relationship between trading volume in a given month
and price changes in earlier months, and try to analyze if it is created by the response of investors
to capital gains taxes or by non-tax reasons. Whatever explanation, investors seem to respond
to past price changes by being more or less willing to trade (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986).
The results of Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) show that taxes do influence turnover, but that
there are other more important motives for trading. As noted above, capital gains taxes create
incentives to realize losses and in some circumstances to defer realizing gains, but Lakonishok
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and Smidt (1986) find that winners tend to have higher abnormal volume than losers, i.e. there
exists a positive cross-sectional correlation between past price changes and current volume. This
relationship is contrary of tax-related responses, and is rather expected if non-tax-related motives
are predominant. According to Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), there are several factors that limit
the extent of tax-induced trading: short-term losses may need to be carried forward to future
years (reducing the tax benefits), investors may be reluctant to realize losses early in the year as
they do not know what the exact consequences will be, high transaction costs may reduce the
incentives to trade, and finally there are taxpayers who do not report realized capital gains on
their tax returns.
At the same time, Dyl (1977) presents analyses suggesting that investors take capital gains tax
liabilities into consideration and that tax incentives also exist for the initiation of transactions.
Shefrin and Statman (1985) discover that the observed patterns of loss and gain realization in
real markets are consistent with a combination of the disposition effect and tax considerations – it
cannot be explained by one of them alone. In addition, investors’ after-tax portfolio performance
can be improved with a better awareness of the disposition effect (Dhar and Zhou, 2006).
Constantinides (1984) find that in the presence of transaction costs, tax-loss selling predicts a
seasonal pattern in trading volume. According to the optimal trading policy, the volume of loss
realizations should peak in December before the end of the tax year, then fall off drastically in
January before gradually increasing again (Constantinides, 1984). This assumption is confirmed
in studies by Constantinides (1984) and others (e.g. Dhar and Zhou, 2006). Equivalently, tax-
gain selling decreases at the end of the year as traders postpone sales to avoid being taxed on the
gains in the current tax year (Ferris et al., 1987). As investors’ trading in the month of December
is affected by tax-selling considerations, the volume of losing stocks will be relatively high as
opposed to what is predicted by the disposition effect (Ferris et al., 1987). The consequence
is a reduced disposition effect in the end of the tax year because tax factors play a larger role
(Barberis and Xiong, 2009). This is confirmed in several studies, for instance by Constantinides
(1984), Ferris et al. (1987), Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), and Grinblatt and Han (2005), and
implies that market prices move closer to fundamental values in December (Grinblatt and Han,
2005).
In January, on the contrary, the disposition effect predicts the same trading pattern as the
tax-loss selling hypothesis, namely that the volume of trading in stocks with capital gains will
be higher than for losses (Ferris et al., 1987). The selling pressure of gains in January may or
may not affect the stock price, but if irrationality or ignorance among investors is assumed, the
seasonal pattern in trading volume maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices where small stocks
experience positive abnormal returns in January, particularly known as the ‘January anomaly’
(Constantinides, 1984). Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) argue that the seasonal variance in the
strength of relationship between past prices and current turnover is evidence that tax-related
motives also influence trading volume.
Several authors (e.g Constantinides, 1984) seem to believe that the loss realization in December
is consistent with rational behavior, because of the additional year’s interest involved. However,
Dhar and Zhou (2006) find that both taxable and tax-deferred accounts exhibit similar disposi-
tion effect, indicating that individuals’ behavior is not changed because of tax considerations in
particular. In addition, Shefrin and Statman (1985) criticise the rational explanation by arguing
that December has no special role in models based upon rational behavior. The framework
individuals presented by Shefrin and Statman (1985) have a rational desire to take advantage of
the tax consequences of gain and loss realization, but are also affected by the disposition effect
and thus have an aversion for loss realization even if they recognize the tax benefits of doing
so (Odean, 1998). The concentration of loss realization in December can therefore rather be
explained by a perceived deadline characteristic where investors exert ’self-control’ by requiring
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themselves to override their disposition to keep losers (Shefrin and Statman, 1985).
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also propose an additional explanation for the increased loss
realization in December, namely that it is partly due to price pressure arising from portfo-
lio managers selling their losers for window dressing reasons. Similarly, the high turnover for
winners in January may be due in part to the high frequency of annual results and analysts’
recommendations released at this time (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986). Finally, Grinblatt and
Han (2002) find that momentum strategies appear to be most effective in December, because of
an additional perturbation in demand arising from tax-loss selling.
As noted earlier, tax considerations and the disposition effect operate in opposite directions,
and this also relates to short-term and long-term conduct. The disposition effect suggests that
investors hold on to their losing investments and close out profitable gains quickly, to lock in
gains. In contrast, tax considerations propose that gains should be realized only when they are
long-term and that losses should be realized while they are short-term. According to Lakonishok
and Smidt (1986) and Constantinides (1984), the volume for winners should be especially large
in the first month after the winner has become long-term, so that future losses will be short-term,
and they refer to this as an ‘insurance motive’. The study by Shefrin and Statman from 1979
find no significant differences associated with various durations, implying that investors seem to
be subject to the disposition effect. Still, they point out that this result could be due to a small
portion of tax-motivated trades in the market, or that those investors subject to the disposition
effect offset the contribution from others.
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4 Methodology and Data
As mentioned earlier, several authors have tried to measure the disposition effect in stock mar-
kets, and many of them presents results in favor of the hypothesis that some investors hold on
to losers too long and sell winners too quickly. This section presents the methodology and data
used to perform the analysis of the disposition effect in the Norwegian equity market. After an
introduction of abnormal turnover, the main model is presented and the relevant data material
is described.
4.1 Methodology
In the examination of the disposition effect in Norway, the correlation between prices and trading
volume will be investigated. The methodology was introduced by Ferris et al. (1987), who
performed the analysis on US stocks in 1988, and is designed to test for the predictions of the
disposition effect using trading volumes and price performance.
Relationship between Normal and Abnormal Trading Volume
There are many factors that may influence the normal trading volume for a specific firm, i, both
internal and external. Dyl (1977) points out that the number of shares a firm has outstanding,
as well as the number of shareholders and how closely the firm is held, are probably the primary
internal factors. When it comes to external factors, determinants that influence more than one
stock, such as information about political events and economics, affect companies. This results in
increased trading volumes because the information changes investors’ expectation, and thereby
their desired portfolio (Dyl, 1977). In his study of the information content of annual earnings
announcements, Beaver (1968) finds that the correlation between market wide events (external
factors) and a firm’s specific trading volume is significantly different from zero. Therefore,
one should always consider external factors in any definition of normal trading volume (Dyl,
1977).
To calculate the expected or normal trading volume for a given stock, i, when taking into account
that external factors may influence the trading volume, an ordinary least square regression is
used where the daily turnover for stock i at day t (Vit) is regressed on the market turnover (Vmt)
at day t.4 The linear regression for the normal trading volume is defined as:
Vit = Ai +BiVmt + eit (4.1)
where
Vit =
Number of shares of stock i traded on day t
Total number of shares of stock i outstanding on day t
Vmt =
Number of shares of all stocks traded on day t
Total number of shares of all stocks outstanding on day t
eit = Abnormal turnover for stock i on day t
The abnormal turnover, eit, from (4.1) is defined as the portion of a firm’s trading volume that
cannot be explained by market influences (Beaver, 1968). From (4.1), the abnormal turnover
can be expressed as the difference between the actual trading volume for stock i observed at day
t, Vit, and the conditional expected trading volume given by:
4The use of turnover is to prevent stock splits to have any effect on the results.
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E(Vit|Vmt) = Ai +BiVmt (4.2)
Negative (positive) eit indicates that the trading volume for stock i was abnormally below
(above) the daily average (Dyl, 1977).
The Emprical Model
In the search for the disposition effect in the Norwegian equity market, the relation of the
abnormal turnover for a stock i at its given price, Pit, to its past turnover is examined. This is
done by a classification of the past price for the stock at an earlier trading day n, Pin, into eight
different price ranges around Pit. The ranges are defined as:
Range 1: Pit < Pin ≤ (1 + x)Pit Range 5: Pit ≥ Pin > (1− x)Pit
Range 2: (1 + x)Pit < Pin ≤ (1 + 2x)Pit Range 6: (1− x)Pit ≥ Pin > (1− 2x)Pit
Range 3: (1 + 2x)Pit < Pin ≤ (1 + 3x)Pit Range 7: (1− 2x)Pit ≥ Pin > (1− 3x)Pit
Range 4: (1 + 3x)Pit < Pin Range 8: (1− 2x)Pit ≥ Pin
That is, if the price on a past trading day, n was greater than on day t, it is classified in one of
the ranges 1 through 4. Similarly, prices lower than on day t would fall in one of the ranges 5
through 8.
For every day t, the price Pin on each past trading day n going back a year from day t, is
classified into its corresponding range according to Pit, and thereafter the belonging turnover
for that day is assigned to the range. After this, all volume assigned to each range is added up,
so that the final product is eight cumulative turnover numbers representing the total abnormal
turnover that occurred in each range. These eight cumulative turnover numbers are then used
in the following regression:
eit = α0 + β1T1it + β2T2it + β3T3it + β4T4it + β5T5it + β6T6it + β7T7it + β8T8it + uit (4.3)
Where Tjit is the cumulative turnover for stock i for all the trading days over the past year when
its price was in range j.
When analyzing the abnormal turnover, the closing price is used and x is set to 0.0755
A drawback with this model is the assumption that the security was bought on day n and sold
on day t, since obviously that is usually not the case. Buyers at a past price may sell before
or after day t, and this makes the cumulative turnovers, Tjit, noisy variables. However, since
volumes at all prices are affected in this way, the results will most likely have no significant bias
because of this problem (Ferris et al., 1987).
To investigate the possibility that the disposition effect is visible in the Norwegian stock mar-
ket, a hypothesis around the regression coefficients, βj , is formed. If the variables β1 to β4 are
negative, the investors are holding on to the losing securities, which support the appearance of
abnormal behavior. On the other hand, if the coefficients are positive the investors are selling
the losing securities, and the disposition effect hypothesis will be rejected. In addition, if the
coefficients are positive in December this supports the tax-selling hypothesis. Similarly, if the
variables β5 to β8 are positive, the investors are selling the winning securities, which is predicted
5Ferris et al. (1987) found no significant difference when changing the x to 0.05 or 0.10.
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by the disposition effect. Accordingly, the hypothesis that is tested is defined in the following
way:
βj < 0 for j = 1,...,4 and βj > 0 for j = 5,...,8
4.2 Data
The data used to examine the existence of the disposition effect in the Norwegian equity market
are prices and turnover for the thirty smallest firms by equity value as of January 2014. The
data covers the period from January 2010 to December 2013 and is collected from the Oslo
stock exchange (Oslobors, 2014)6. The reason for examining the thirty smallest firms on the
Norwegian stock exchange, is because the stocks belonging to small market capitalization firms
are characterized by more volatile return patterns, and therefore it will be a higher chance of
detecting abnormal investor behavior in these stocks (Ferris et al., 1987).
6The stocks that are chosen have been listed the whole period, and are traded sufficiently.
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5 Results
In this section, the results from the empirical analysis will be presented, but first there will be
a short discussion around choices that are made and noise that might affect the results.
5.1 Choices and Noise that can affect the Results
Some choices have been made for the analysis due to regression robustness, convenient data
separation and non-trading days.
The first choice is done to obtain more power for the regression. In particular, data for one
trading day is pooled from three different years instead of one, and as a result there will be
ninety observations for each trading day. This implies that unexpected events will have less
impact on the overall results.
The second choice is regarding the separation of the data. The last day of the year is used as a
crossroad for the analysis, meaning that the last trading day in December is the last trading day
for all the three years that the stocks are pooled from, and the first trading day in January is the
first trading day for all the three years, i.e. irrespective of the specific date. Consequently, some
of the last trading days placed in the January category will consist of some days from January
and some from February, and the same will apply for the first trading days in December. This
is a result of a different number of trading days in the three years the data are pooled from.
Therefore, the regression results for the days in the beginning of the months for August to
December, and the regression results for the last days of the months for January to June should
be interpreted with caution.
Third, since the smallest firms per equity value are chosen, the data consists of several days with
no trading activity. At the same time, to be able to do the analysis a closing price is needed
for all the trading days. Therefore, the closing price for the non-trading days is set equal to the
closing price on the previous day.
There are several factors that make the results noisy. For instance, the noise in the data might
be a result of counter-effects, such as tax-loss selling or momentum strategies, that can erase
(or in some cases increase) the symptoms of disposition effect. First, tax-loss selling will dilute
the results of the disposition effect in December, since the two trading patterns contradict each
other. Both effects can be present in the market, but not be visible, because of the contradictory
symptoms. One the other hand, tax-gain selling will strengthen the results of the disposition
effect in January, because both trading patters predict the same behavior for January. Secondly,
the momentum strategy will dilute the symptoms of the disposition effect during the entire year,
since investors following this strategy will do the opposite of investors prone to the disposition
effect.
Another factor that can bias the results is illiquidity, linked to the choice about the non-trading
days. In Table 1, the average number of non-trading days for each month for each year the data
is pooled from is listed together with average for all the years. From Table 1, it can be seen that
there is on average about three non-trading days each month.
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Table 1: Average non-trading days for each month
Month ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 Average
January 2.4 3.4 2.4 3.8 3.0
February 3.1 2.1 2.7 3.3 2.8
March 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.9 3.2
April 1.4 2.4 3.3 4.5 2.9
May 1.5 2.7 4.1 3.6 3.0
June 2.6 2.5 4.6 3.4 3.3
July 2.9 3.9 5.6 4.2 4.1
August 2.8 3.6 5.2 3.7 3.8
September 2.6 3.6 4.4 2.8 3.4
October 2.1 3.9 4.9 2.4 3.3
November 1.6 3.2 3.6 2.0 2.6
December 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.9
These non-trading days can both positively and negatively influence the evidence of the disposi-
tion effect in the Norwegian market. The reason is that the existence of non-trading days implies
a less liquid company, which means that the stocks belonging to these firms can be harder to
trade. Therefore, even if an investor wants to sell his stocks when his utility is above (disposition
effect) or below (rational) origo, he might not be able to do it because nobody wants to buy
it.
5.2 Daily Values
According to the hypothesis, the disposition effect is present in the Norwegian equity market if
the first four beta coefficients, excluding the intercept, are negative, and the last four are positive.
In Table 2, the regression coefficients for December are switching between positive and negative
values for all the trading days. Consequently, the results do not point in one clear direction.
The January results are also scattered, and it can be noted that the January coefficients are
on average less significant than the December coefficients. In summary, the disposition effect
in Norway is more visible in December than in January, but there are some deviations in the
results and so a distinct conclusion cannot be made.
Still, the results present some interesting findings. Starting with the December results, the first
four coefficients are on average more negative than positive, suggesting that the majority of the
investors hold on to their losing investment, in accordance with the disposition effect. The only
exception is β3, which is predominantly positive, indicating that investors sell their investments
when the return is in the interval (-15%, -22.5%). This exception can be a result of the tax-loss
selling effect, which is realistic since a loss in this order of magnitude can give a significant tax
gain that is worth more to the investor than his pride.
Regarding the last four coefficients for December, coefficient 5 and 7 are predominantly signifi-
cant and positive, while coefficient 6 and 8 are less significant and predominantly negative. This
indicates that investors sell their stocks when the return is either in the interval (0% - 7.5%) or
(15% – 22.5%), and predominantly keep their stocks if the return is between 7.5% and 15%, or
higher than 22.5%. The fact that investors sell when the return is in the first of the last four
intervals (e.g. close to origo) can be explained by the steepness of the utility curve in figure 2.1,
since the loss if the price moves in the left direction is much bigger than the profit if the price
moves to the right. The slope of the utility curve gets less steep further away from the origin,
which can explain why investors hold on to their investments in the higher intervals, since their
loss if the price moves in the left direction is not nearly as big as it is in the fourth interval.
RESULTS 29
T
ab
le
2:
D
ai
ly
va
lu
es
fo
r
D
ec
em
be
r
an
d
Ja
nu
ar
y
fo
r
th
e
th
ir
ty
sm
al
le
st
fir
m
s
on
O
SE
T
ra
di
ng
da
y
α
0
β
1
β
2
β
3
β
4
β
5
β
6
β
7
β
8
R
2 A
dj
D
W
D
ec
em
be
r
1
-0
.0
00
69
(0
.0
16
1)
*
-0
.0
15
10
(0
.0
80
9)
0.
03
92
1
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
21
92
(0
.1
40
1)
0.
00
04
2
(0
.3
33
2)
0.
01
45
5
(0
.0
19
6)
*
-0
.0
56
81
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
05
82
4
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
03
40
(0
.1
39
0)
0.
54
49
1.
71
29
2
-0
.0
00
80
(0
.0
05
9)
**
-0
.0
09
19
(0
.1
88
5)
-0
.0
15
15
(0
.1
12
2)
0.
06
52
6
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
01
23
(0
.0
05
7)
**
0.
01
24
7
(0
.0
35
4)
*
-0
.0
25
31
(0
.0
55
0)
0.
00
58
9
(0
.6
54
0)
0.
00
27
2
(0
.2
07
4)
0.
34
76
1.
78
69
3
-0
.0
00
76
(0
.2
88
0)
0.
00
37
0
(0
.8
69
0)
0.
02
34
1
(0
.3
12
0)
0.
03
69
1
(0
.1
34
0)
-0
.0
01
92
(0
.1
33
0)
0.
02
17
6
(0
.1
90
0)
-0
.0
29
83
(0
.2
81
0)
0.
00
04
7
(0
.9
87
0)
0.
00
22
9
(0
.5
20
)
0.
08
62
1.
75
83
4
-0
.0
00
78
(0
.2
06
2)
-0
.0
14
76
(0
.5
52
5)
-0
.0
21
14
(0
.3
93
1)
0.
06
56
6
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
00
59
(0
.4
98
5)
00
59
6
(0
.6
42
4)
-0
.0
77
75
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
11
48
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
00
49
7
(0
.0
75
2)
0.
77
38
1.
92
65
5
-0
.0
00
90
(0
.1
54
8)
-0
.0
34
58
(0
.1
02
2)
0.
02
22
3
(0
.0
24
9)
*
0.
00
98
5
(0
.5
25
6)
-0
.0
01
39
(0
.1
18
7)
0.
08
21
4
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
73
61
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
04
98
3
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
04
44
(0
.1
08
8)
0.
66
5
1.
81
09
6
-0
.0
00
31
(0
.6
09
3)
0.
02
68
2
(0
.1
17
5)
-0
.0
12
26
(0
.6
08
5)
0.
03
69
0
(0
.0
79
9)
-0
.0
02
77
(0
.0
31
7)
*
-0
.0
11
24
(0
.3
79
6)
-0
.0
63
92
(0
.0
00
25
)*
**
0.
06
19
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
00
85
0
(0
.0
01
5)
**
0.
29
7
1.
63
91
7
-0
.0
00
56
(0
.2
50
7)
-0
.0
39
10
(0
.0
08
3)
**
0.
07
70
7
(0
.0
00
9)
**
*
-0
.0
43
73
(0
.0
46
6)
*
0.
00
11
8
(0
.2
77
6)
0.
01
96
0
(0
.0
83
5)
-0
.0
10
02
(0
.3
51
8)
0.
02
62
0
(0
.0
36
4)
*
-0
.0
04
03
(0
.0
16
5)
*
0.
27
05
2.
25
15
8
-0
.0
00
72
(0
.0
04
4)
**
-0
.0
13
05
(0
.0
43
1)
*
0.
03
11
4
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
19
77
(0
.0
20
1)
*
0.
00
04
5
(0
.3
51
5)
0.
01
37
1
(0
.0
00
2)
**
*
-0
.0
32
66
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
02
96
3
(0
.0
00
2)
**
*
0.
00
01
2
(0
.8
90
2)
0.
63
05
1.
48
65
9
0.
00
27
1
(0
.1
86
3)
-0
.1
27
68
(0
.0
47
2)
*
-0
.0
91
77
(0
.3
52
2)
0.
00
12
1
(0
.9
88
9)
0.
01
14
2
(0
.0
01
5)
**
0.
01
56
1
(0
.6
88
9)
0.
06
23
4
(0
.2
18
9)
0.
04
59
1
(0
.4
99
8)
-0
.0
17
13
(0
.0
07
3)
**
0.
17
65
2.
14
11
10
-0
.0
01
13
(0
.0
14
8)
*
-0
.1
36
29
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
19
44
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
81
15
(0
.0
10
8)
*
0.
01
37
2
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
05
08
9
(0
.0
11
8)
*
-0
.0
35
82
(0
.1
96
0)
0.
08
01
9
(0
.0
92
1)
-0
.0
12
07
(0
.0
45
8)
*
0.
80
77
2.
14
28
11
-0
.0
01
54
(0
.1
37
1)
-0
.0
49
39
(0
.0
86
8)
0.
11
93
2
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.1
19
92
(0
.0
00
1)
**
*
-0
.0
02
30
(0
.2
55
7)
0.
12
66
3
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
28
07
(0
.3
92
6)
-0
.1
20
38
(0
.0
06
6)
**
0.
03
14
1
(0
.0
07
6)
**
0.
82
48
1.
88
89
12
-0
.0
02
89
(0
.0
92
4)
-0
.0
70
37
(0
.1
10
0)
-0
.0
41
00
(0
.4
90
7)
0.
19
22
(0
.0
11
8)
*
-0
.0
19
1
(0
.0
00
1)
**
*
0.
38
80
6
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.4
61
52
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
26
04
1
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
31
51
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
83
44
1.
97
4
13
-0
.0
04
31
(0
.0
02
19
)*
*
-0
.0
70
70
(0
.0
14
1)
*
-0
.0
81
24
(0
.1
81
3)
0.
13
10
8
(0
.0
35
2)
*
-0
.0
00
42
(0
.9
15
0)
0.
31
04
4
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.1
47
91
(0
.0
00
7)
**
*
0.
08
30
6
(0
.0
40
6)
*
-0
.0
05
71
(0
.3
51
1)
0.
94
36
2.
00
7
14
-0
.0
01
48
(0
.0
10
9)
*
0.
09
70
7
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.1
04
34
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
09
01
6
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
00
55
0
(0
.0
01
8)
**
-0
.0
09
60
(0
.3
64
3)
0.
02
06
9
(0
.1
72
2)
0.
01
97
8
(0
.0
29
6)
*
-0
.0
05
96
(0
.0
12
2)
*
0.
91
65
1.
44
8
30 RESULTS
15
-0
.0
01
06
(0
.0
69
1)
0.
01
80
7
(0
.1
58
0)
-0
.0
47
42
(0
.0
69
7)
0.
04
46
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
00
71
5
(0
.0
00
5)
**
*
0.
02
75
2
(0
.0
51
6)
-0
.0
60
16
(0
.0
03
3)
**
0.
04
20
8
(0
.0
03
9)
**
0.
00
09
2
(0
.6
12
5)
0.
76
09
2.
07
42
16
-0
.0
00
02
(0
.9
81
0)
-0
.0
02
02
(0
.9
02
2)
-0
.0
66
00
(0
.0
24
0)
*
0.
01
67
0
(0
.0
49
4)
*
0.
00
06
6
(0
.7
27
3)
0.
07
29
8
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
-0
.0
86
60
(0
.0
02
8)
**
0.
04
33
0
(0
.0
33
3)
*
-0
.0
00
80
(0
.6
75
7)
0.
35
10
1.
76
81
17
-0
.0
03
43
(0
.0
08
7)
**
-0
.0
19
92
(0
.4
20
1)
-0
.0
26
35
(0
.7
03
4)
0.
30
27
5
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
18
78
(0
.0
00
1)
**
*
0.
16
53
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
32
92
(0
.4
90
5)
-0
.0
36
92
(0
.3
15
6)
0.
00
76
2
(0
.0
40
7)
*
0.
79
05
2.
05
51
18
-0
.0
01
10
(0
.1
98
1)
-0
.0
32
08
(0
.0
88
1)
0.
00
70
5
(0
.9
01
1)
0.
09
15
2
(0
.0
13
5)
*
-0
.0
05
32
(0
.1
60
4)
0.
07
07
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
25
95
(0
.0
71
5)
0.
06
17
5
(0
.0
04
1)
**
-0
.0
12
48
(0
.0
04
6)
**
0.
84
07
1.
87
97
Ja
nu
ar
y
1
-0
.0
00
55
(0
.1
85
8)
-0
.0
01
12
(0
.9
33
4)
0.
00
51
8
(0
.5
93
4)
-0
.0
04
64
(0
.8
32
7)
0.
00
38
6
(0
.0
70
8)
-0
.0
05
41
(0
.6
45
3)
-0
.0
50
86
(0
.0
04
3)
**
0.
02
24
8
(0
.0
02
3)
**
-0
.0
00
89
(0
.7
38
6)
0.
25
81
1.
46
32
2
0.
00
00
1
(0
.9
86
0)
-0
.0
11
53
(0
.3
68
0)
0.
00
43
6
(0
.5
91
0)
0.
00
87
0
(0
.6
42
0)
-0
.0
00
49
(0
.8
15
0)
-0
.0
06
04
(0
.5
38
0)
-0
.0
14
44
(0
.2
82
0)
0.
00
15
3
(0
.8
70
0)
0.
01
11
0
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
30
96
1.
67
29
3
-0
.0
00
58
(0
.0
57
1)
-0
.0
15
21
(0
.0
05
2)
**
-0
.0
00
10
(0
.9
88
2)
-0
.0
03
59
(0
.8
22
3)
0.
00
39
5
(0
.0
29
3)
0.
00
99
1
(0
.3
68
1)
-0
.0
14
91
(0
.1
35
1)
-0
.0
27
14
(0
.0
01
7)
**
0.
02
04
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
05
94
1
1.
70
17
4
-0
.0
00
14
(0
.7
81
0)
-0
.0
00
30
(0
.9
85
6)
-0
.0
16
25
(0
.5
44
7)
-0
.0
05
91
(0
.5
56
1)
0.
00
40
3
(0
.1
50
8)
0.
01
44
5
(0
.3
94
0)
-0
.0
30
41
(0
.2
07
0)
-0
.0
34
33
(0
.0
16
1)
*
0.
01
77
1
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
24
02
1.
58
87
5
-0
.0
00
20
(0
.5
03
7)
-0
.0
27
67
(0
.0
06
0)
**
0.
00
38
5
(0
.7
78
2)
0.
00
39
3
(0
.5
04
3)
-0
.0
00
19
(0
.8
99
3)
0.
01
29
7
(0
.1
64
3)
0.
01
53
2
(0
.2
21
5)
-0
.0
27
74
(0
.0
00
7)
**
*
0.
00
90
0
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
32
58
1.
84
13
6
-0
.0
00
36
(0
.1
50
8)
-0
.0
19
67
(0
.0
10
0)
**
-0
.0
03
06
(0
.7
86
2)
0.
00
28
2
(0
.5
86
0)
-0
.0
00
95
(0
.2
54
1)
-0
.0
06
36
(0
.5
42
6)
0.
01
86
2
(0
.0
39
3)
*
0.
00
11
3
(0
.8
45
7)
0.
00
41
9
(0
.0
08
2)
**
0.
32
22
1.
54
19
7
-0
.0
01
13
(0
.0
02
0)
**
-0
.0
27
15
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
0.
00
27
1
(0
.7
33
3)
0.
03
78
3
(0
.0
62
5)
0.
01
41
7
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
07
07
(0
.6
59
0)
0.
00
56
7
(0
.6
49
2)
-0
.0
15
87
(0
.0
80
48
)
0.
00
76
5
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
0.
84
23
1.
56
83
8
-0
.0
00
33
(0
.2
29
2)
-0
.0
23
42
(0
.0
00
1)
**
*
-0
.0
08
09
(0
.4
54
1)
0.
00
80
4
(0
.1
49
9)
-0
.0
00
14
(0
.9
13
2)
0.
00
89
2
(0
.5
24
3)
0.
01
74
9
(0
.1
09
4)
0.
00
52
2
(0
.3
90
4)
-0
.0
01
25
(0
.4
25
5)
23
74
1.
80
31
9
-0
.0
00
50
(0
.7
86
2)
-0
.0
32
27
(0
.6
82
0)
-0
.2
20
01
(0
.1
46
0)
0.
01
22
1
(0
.7
49
1)
0.
00
88
7
(0
.2
85
3)
0.
31
69
2
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.1
32
71
(0
.0
40
7)
*
-0
.0
08
23
(0
.8
50
8)
-0
.0
08
41
(0
.4
88
4)
0.
25
43
2.
12
4
10
-0
.0
00
53
(0
.0
89
6)
-0
.0
09
43
(0
.3
03
9)
-0
.0
21
91
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
0.
00
34
8
(0
.5
96
3)
0.
00
00
9
(0
.9
26
6)
0.
01
24
9
(0
.2
11
3)
-0
.0
07
75
(0
.4
70
1)
0.
00
17
5
(0
.7
72
6)
0.
00
63
3
(0
.0
03
6)
**
0.
30
33
1.
06
35
RESULTS 31
11
-0
.0
00
13
(0
.8
55
0)
-0
.0
23
79
(0
.2
94
0)
-0
.0
12
19
(0
.4
92
0)
0.
01
40
9
(0
.3
52
0)
-0
.0
03
56
(0
.2
61
0)
0.
01
32
5
(0
.4
61
0)
0.
03
79
1
(0
.1
77
0)
-0
.0
05
68
(0
.6
85
0)
-0
.0
00
58
(0
.9
03
0)
-0
.0
33
3
1.
98
95
12
-0
.0
00
35
(0
.1
50
9)
-0
.0
16
07
(0
.0
38
0)
*
0.
00
17
4
(0
.7
38
3)
-0
.0
04
88
(0
.7
07
3)
0.
00
10
8
(0
.4
34
8)
0.
00
60
7
(0
.3
76
7)
-0
.0
03
61
(0
.7
57
6)
-0
.0
04
78
(0
.3
92
8)
0.
00
48
4
(0
.0
03
4)
**
0.
07
34
1.
59
57
13
-0
.0
00
11
(0
.9
39
9)
-0
.2
09
45
(0
.0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
10
08
(0
.7
07
1)
0.
03
48
4
(0
.2
77
6)
0.
00
77
2
(0
.1
40
3)
0.
21
42
7
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.1
87
77
(0
.0
05
2)
**
0.
00
89
8
(0
.7
84
4)
0.
06
74
7
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
48
54
1.
74
12
14
-0
.0
00
09
(0
.9
01
2)
-0
.0
61
00
(0
.0
20
5)
*
0.
07
38
2
(0
.0
01
6)
**
-0
.0
14
60
(0
.1
88
8)
0.
00
05
5
(0
.8
77
5)
-0
.0
04
57
(0
.7
98
4)
-0
.0
14
97
(0
.6
42
5)
-0
.0
18
57
(0
.2
29
5)
0.
02
38
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
32
59
1.
85
15
15
-0
.0
00
53
(0
.8
48
1)
-0
.1
46
87
(0
.0
56
8)
0.
00
31
4
(0
.9
57
3)
0.
01
60
9
(0
.7
77
9)
0.
02
04
3
(0
.0
68
2)
0.
36
11
5
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.4
94
97
(0
.0
01
0)
**
0.
00
89
8
(0
.8
86
7)
0.
02
23
5
(0
.2
09
5)
0.
37
41
2.
18
87
16
-0
.0
00
77
(0
.0
16
2)
*
-0
.0
00
10
(0
.9
88
2)
-0
.0
18
69
(0
.0
01
2)
**
-0
.0
02
02
(0
.7
53
8)
-0
.0
05
71
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
06
74
(0
.4
45
6)
0.
06
44
3
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
01
07
3
(0
.1
51
1)
-0
.0
04
47
(0
.0
53
3)
0.
44
93
1.
84
30
17
-0
.0
00
04
(0
.9
03
6)
-0
.0
02
0
(0
.7
46
1)
-0
.0
25
79
(0
.0
00
3)
**
*
-0
.0
00
20
(0
.9
73
8)
-0
.0
00
06
(0
.9
46
1)
-0
.0
00
59
(0
.9
47
2)
0.
02
11
3
(0
.1
41
3)
0.
00
59
0
(0
.3
80
7)
-0
.0
04
20
(0
.0
54
69
)
0.
24
18
1.
86
01
18
-0
.0
00
29
(0
.4
97
9)
0.
01
96
9
(0
.0
61
5)
-0
.0
44
50
(0
.0
00
1)
0.
00
58
1
(0
.4
76
4)
0.
00
64
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
15
83
(0
.1
43
2)
0.
03
90
6
(0
.2
32
7)
-0
.0
13
89
(0
.2
55
2)
-0
.0
01
89
(0
.5
39
6)
0.
26
14
1.
94
55
19
-0
.0
00
35
(0
.7
67
0)
0.
08
96
9
(0
.0
01
78
)*
*
-0
.0
22
10
(0
.6
13
1)
-0
.0
34
69
(0
.0
55
6)
-0
.0
04
57
(0
.1
10
0)
0.
04
63
3
(0
.0
80
0)
-0
.0
93
99
(0
.2
60
0)
0.
02
09
5
(0
.5
22
9)
-0
.0
10
88
(0
.2
25
8)
0.
10
79
2.
21
74
20
-0
.0
00
27
(0
.3
35
9)
0.
00
12
0
(0
.8
76
8)
-0
.0
13
79
(0
.1
72
3)
-0
.0
10
61
(0
.0
10
9)
*
-0
.0
01
16
(0
.0
57
9)
-0
.0
00
79
(0
.8
85
6)
0.
00
27
2
(0
.8
76
7)
0.
00
25
2
(0
.7
30
5)
-0
.0
03
24
(0
.1
36
2)
0.
32
07
1.
32
01
21
-0
.0
00
82
(0
.0
60
8)
0.
00
30
1
(0
.8
16
0)
-0
.0
20
90
(0
.2
91
3)
0.
01
16
8
(0
.0
86
2)
0.
00
15
7
(0
.3
47
9)
0.
00
65
2
(0
.5
60
7)
0.
06
40
0
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
09
23
(0
.3
18
7)
-0
.0
10
93
(0
.0
01
2)
*
0.
29
82
2.
10
15
22
-0
.0
00
33
(0
.4
12
9)
-0
.0
09
53
(0
.4
00
6)
0.
01
84
3
(0
.1
43
1)
-0
.0
03
01
(0
.6
98
1)
-0
.0
02
12
(0
.0
75
8)
-0
.0
23
93
(0
.0
32
2)
*
0.
09
92
8
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
-0
.0
15
10
(0
.0
31
4)
*
-0
.0
14
44
(0
.0
00
0)
**
*
0.
50
18
1.
70
09
**
*L
ev
el
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
w
it
hi
n
0.
1%
**
Le
ve
lo
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
w
it
hi
n
1.
0%
*L
ev
el
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
w
it
hi
n
5.
0%
32 RESULTS
In January, half of the investors hold on to their stocks in all of the intervals, while the other half
sells their stocks. The only coefficient that is separate from the others is β1, which is noticeably
more negative than positive. This results suggests that the disposition effect for January is only
visible in the first interval (-7.5%, 0), since in this interval the majority of the investors hold on
to their investment.
5.3 Monthly Values
The monthly values in Table 3 are calculated by averaging the daily values for each month. β1
is negative for all the months except June, which indicates that the majority of the investors in
the Norwegian equity market have a tendency to hold on to their losing stocks when the loss is
of smaller magnitude. February is the only month where the evidence for the disposition effect
is truly visible. For the rest of the months, the regression coefficients change between positive
and negative values for the last seven coefficients.
The figures below present the number of positive and negative coefficients sorted by quarters
and separated between the first and last four regression coefficients. For the first four coefficients
presented in Figure 5.1, it can be seen that there are predominately more negative coefficients
than positive, but that there is no significant dominance. In Figure 5.2, where the last four
coefficients are presented, the positive coefficients are far from dominating. In particular, for
two of the quarters there are actually more negative coefficients than positive. In consequence,
no precise conclusion about the presence of the disposition effect in the Norwegian stock market
during these months can be made.
Figure 5.1: Number of positive and negative coefficients for the first four regression coefficients,
sorted by quarters
Figure 5.2: Number of positive and negative coefficients for the last four regression coefficients,
sorted by quarters
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5.4 The Disposition Effect in a Smaller Frame
The conclusion regarding the existence of the disposition effect in the Norwegian Equity market
has been drawn from the results by the use of the hypothesis, i.e. that coefficient β1 to β4 should
be less than zero, and coefficient β5 to β8 should be above zero. So far, as the results presented
above show, no distinct conclusion about the disposition effect can be made
At the same time, if the focus is concentrated on the area where the utility curve is steepest,
i.e. around origo, the results might be different. For the steepest part, only β1, and β5, are of
interest. A reason for looking at the interval covered by β1, i.e. the first negative interval, is
that investors are most likely affected by the disposition effect on different levels. Therefore,
β1, which represents the interval where investors have the most to gain if the stock market goes
upward again, would therefore catch everyone, even those that are just partly affected by the
disposition effect. An argument for looking at the first positive interval, covered by β5, is that
most investors affected by the disposition effect would probably sell their shares already in this
interval, since it is in this interval they have the most to lose by holding on to their shares.
Therefore, with this argument in mind, the betas in the subsequent intervals are less likely to be
positive, i.e. investors selling their shares, since these coefficients reflect more rational investors’
behavior.
From Table 3, 11 out of 12 months had a negative β1, and 10 out of 12 months had a positive β5.
In Figure 5.3 and 5.4, the number of positive and negative coefficients for β1, and β5 for each
month is shown. The results point in the direction of the disposition effect for both β1, and β5.
For β1, 69% of the coefficients were negative, and for β5, 64% of the coefficients were positive.
This indicates that the majority of the investors hold on to their shares when the return is
between 0 and -7.5%, and sell their stocks when the return is between 0 and 7.5%. From Figure
5.3 and 5.4, it is clear that the disposition effect is more visible in the months November and
December. According to Table 1, these months have the lowest number of non-trading days,
meaning that there is a small chance that the result is caused by illiquidity.
Figure 5.3: Number of positive and negative coefficients for β1 for each month
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Figure 5.4: Number of positive and negative coefficients for β5 for each month
In a more statistical perspective, one can assume that the coefficients are random variables which
follow a binomial distribution with parameters n and p, β ∼ B(n, p). p = 50%, is the probability
for one successive outcome, and n = 249, is the number of trials.
The cumulative probability for β1, and β5 is then:
Pr(β1 > 170) = 1.8391E − 10
Pr(β5 > 159) = 4.0104E − 06
From the results in this section, more evidence supporting the disposition effect in the Norwegian
equity market is presented. Even with the noise from the methodology, and the possible counter-
effects diluting the evidence of the disposition effect, the cumulative probability presented above
makes it clear that the high number of negative signs for β1 and positive signs for β5 is far from
random. This strengthens the conclusion that there is evidence of the disposition effect in the
steepest part of the utility curve in Norway.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to analyze the investment behavior of market participants in Norway,
particularly by measuring the extent of the disposition effect. In simple terms, investors who
exhibit the disposition effect demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than
losers. There is a growing literature indicating that the disposition effect is useful for explaining
several asset pricing anomalies, and the main contribution of this paper is to provide more
evidence to the investigation of the disposition effect in developed markets, here represented by
Oslo Stock Exchange. The paper aims to understand as clearly and analytically as possible how
a perturbation of investors’ demand for a stock due to the disposition effect generates deviations
from the rational equilibrium. More specifically, it has been examined how past price increases
(decreases) have a positive (negative) impact on trading volume.
The disposition effect occurs because investors use their purchase price as a reference price,
and are reluctant to realize losses due to regret aversion. The theory presented in this paper
is combining several behavioral finance and real market aspects to support and explain the
disposition effect theory and several aspects of it. In addition, challenges when measuring the
disposition effect are presented, such as counter-effects that exist in financial markets.
The empirical analysis has attempted to measure the extent of the disposition effect in Norway,
and the research is based on the idea that investors’ response to past price patterns might
create a relationship between trading volume in a given day and previous price changes. The
results present scattered evidence, suggesting that the disposition effect exists to some extent in
Norway. That is, the findings weakly support the results of Shefrin and Statman (1985) and are
inconsistent with EMH. As suggested by Dhar and Zhou (2006), the variation in the evidence
for the disposition effect is partly due to differences in trading frequency and demographic
characteristics that proxy for knowledge about investment products. The evidence for tax-loss
selling, representing the opposite prediction of the disposition effect, is limited. Therefore, it
can be inferred that tax-induced traders form a minor portion of all traders, or that those who
typify the disposition effect offset their contribution.
The observed phenomena can be explained by investors’ deviations from expected utility theory,
but they cannot completely rule out other theories. For instance, investors might misperceive
probabilities of future price change, e.g. they may think losing stocks will bounce back and
winning stocks will fall (i.e. a belief in mean reversion). As mentioned in section 2, there are a
number of other non-disposition related motives that could account for the relationship between
past price changes and volume, such as rebalancing of portfolios, trading strategies based on
past prices (e.g. the momentum strategy) and psychological theories that are not accounted for
in this paper. Moreover, it is highly possible that multiple phenomena exist synchronously in
the stock market. The diverging evidence for the disposition effect illustrate the requirement
for a more sophisticated model of investor behavior and more specific data material, such as
individual investor trading records.
An important objective for subsequent studies should be to identify the motives that account
for the trading patterns that are observed in this paper, as it would be interesting to separate
the disposition effect and other effects more carefully. In addition, market microstructure mod-
els, such as the disposition effect model in this paper, assuming the existence of noise traders
(irrational) and informed traders (rational) could be enriched by incorporating investors with
varying degrees of biases or information (Shapira and Venezia, 2001). Finally, it can be noted
that the findings in favor of the disposition effect can help investors to obtain higher returns, as
they are informed of the existence of the disposition bias and its implications, and can adjust
their trading accordingly.
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Paper 2:
Herd Behavior
in the Norwegian Equity Market
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine herding behavior in the Norwegian equity market. This
is done by applying daily data and volumes from OBX covering the period from
January 2000 to December 2013, separated into four different data sets. We ap-
ply two different methologies to the data, where the first analyses the relationship
between cross-sectional deviations of asset returns and the corresponding market re-
turns, based on the assumption that dispersions are low when individual returns herd
around the market. The second method is based on idiosyncratic returns and abnor-
mal turnover for individual stocks, justified by the assumption that herd behavior
leads to increased trading volumes.
Using the approaches, we find no significant evidence of herding in the Norwegian
market. When adjusting for up and down markets, the evidence suggests asymmetric
behavior in the market, but no presence of herding. The results from applying
quantile regression to estimate the herding equation for multiple market conditions
are also inconsistent with the presence of herding. Since theory suggests that herding
may be more prevalent during extreme market conditions, we also specifically test for
herd behavior during the financial crisis in 2008 and get compatible results. The same
conclusion also applies for the method based on abnormal turnover. Our evidence
supports the predictions of rational financial models, and suggests that herding is
not an important factor in determining equity returns in the Norwegian market. The
results coincide with similar empirical research on developed markets, and can partly
be explained by sufficient access to diverse information and investment opportunities
on individual stocks in this market.
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1 Introduction
On November 8, 2007, Renewable Energy Corporation reached all time high with a share
price of NOK 301 on the Norwegian stock market. Two months later the share price was down
to NOK 125. During less than 100 days the share price had dropped by almost 60 percent, and
4 years later the share price was down to NOK 0.628. Looking at the bigger picture, the same
behavior can be found earlier in this decade, during the dotcom crisis, and in 2008 during the
financial crisis. The observed phenomenon can be characterized by a rapid expansion followed
by a contraction, and is given the name economic bubble after the first evidence of its occurrence
in March 1637 under tulip mania (Garber, 1990).
Economic bubbles and other anomalies in financial markets occur for several reasons, and they
have been a popular research topic in finance for many years. Lux (1995) explains the emergence
of bubbles as a self-organizing process of contagion among traders, leading to equilibrium prices
which deviate from fundamental values. Further, he postulates that there is one basic economic
variable, namely returns, that decide the speculators’ readiness to follow the crowd. If the
returns are above average, a more optimistic attitude arises among speculators that foster the
disposition to overtake others positive view, and vice versa. The willingness of a speculator to
imitate the observed decision of others or movements in the market, rather than to follow his
own views and information, is called herd behavior.
According to Fromlet (2001), the concept of herd behavior may be the most generally recognized
observation on financial markets in a psychological context, especially during financial crises. For
private investors, the underlying reason for herd behavior is often lack of accurate information
and the assumption that the “majority is always right”. In the case of money managers, the
damage done to a reputation after bad decisions can always be limited if the manager is in line
with the consensus.
The main purpose of this paper is to use theory on herding behavior and earlier empirical stud-
ies from foreign stock markets as a foundation for empirical tests of herding behavior in the
Norwegian stock market. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine herding behavior in
the Norwegian market, so the contribution of this paper is to extend the existing literature on
investor herds to include evidence from Norway. Another reason for studying the Norwegian
market is to examine herding behavior in an economy that is highly sensitive to oil prices and sup-
ported by oil revenues. In addition, Oslo Stock Exchange has an unique position for companies
in the Energy, Shipping and Seafood sectors. It is the largest European marketplace for shipping
securities and the world’s largest marketplace for seafood securities (Oslobors, 2013).
The empirical analysis will use stock market data and market portfolio data from the Oslo
Stock Exchange, in particular daily asset returns and turnover. The first sample includes 54 of
the most traded securities on the exchange, collected from the OBX over the period 03.01.00 -
28.06.13. The second sample consists of the stocks that were on the Norwegian stock market
by 31.08.13, that also existed during the financial crisis, covering the period from January 2008
to December 2010. The third sample is created by separating out the stocks that form the five
largest sectors on Oslo Stock Exchange from the second sample. The fourth and final sample
consists of the thirty smallest firms on Oslo Stock Exchange by equity value as of January 2014.
Based on a comprehensive literature research, three different models will be employed on the
data. The first two models are cross-sectional models that measure herding on the basis of
individual return dispersion from market return. The third model focuses on individual shares,
and measures herding based on idiosyncratic return and abnormal turnover.
The first model was introduced by Christie and Huang in 1995, and measures herd behavior un-
der extreme market moves based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of returns (CSSD) in
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relation to the market return. The second model is an extension of the CSSD model, proposed
by Chang et al. (2000), which examines the existence of herding by analysing the relationship be-
tween cross-sectional absolute deviations (CSAD) of asset returns and the corresponding market
returns. The last model is inspired by the work of Chen et al. (2004), where herding is inves-
tigated from a volume perspective. The CSAD model will be the main focus in the empirical
analysis of this paper, and it will be combined with quantile regression to allow for the study of
different market conditions. The focus will be to investigate herding behavior in the Norwegian
market, in addition to different market sectors, during the financial crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the previous
literature concerning herd behavior. Section 3 summarizes previous empirical work on investor
herds in stock markets. Section 4 provides the details of the testing methodologies employed
to detect herding, and describes the data collection. Section 5 reports the results from the
empirical analysis and discusses the findings. Conclusions and recommendations for further
work are presented in section 6.
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2 Herding Behavior
Shiller (2003) writes that one of the particular concerns related to the performance of stocks
in the market has been the observed excess volatility, relative to what would be predicted by
the efficient markets model. Investment portfolios are frequently affected by excess volatility
in stock and bond prices, and examples include: the stock market crash of 1987, the dot-com
bubble and the financial crisis of 2008.
The focus in this paper is on herd behavior, a concept that can be linked to the extreme
volatility and destabilization that is sometimes observed in markets (Lao and Singh, 2011).
Herd behavior is thus a signal of market inefficiency, affecting share prices and influencing
the accuracy of stock valuation (Chang et al., 2000). Herding can be defined as an investment
strategy based on individuals imitating other investors’ actions or the market consensus, without
paying attention to their own belief or information, even if one believes the market is wrong
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). The psychology underlying herd behavior is that individual
investors assume other investors have access to better information than themselves, hence that
increases or decreases in stock prices resulting from investor trading is reflecting the correct
market conditions. The motivation for herding is related to the number of other people already
partaking in a given action, and Rook (2006) presents research explaining how people solve
the mental conflict of a perceived wrong answer by using the heuristic “the majority is always
right”.
2.1 Spurious and Rational Herding
It is important to note that spurious herding will occur in markets when groups facing sim-
ilar information take similar decisions. This is not herding according to the definition given
earlier, because the investors are making individual decisions from publicly known information
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). It is important to distinguish between spurious herding and
intentional herding, because it is the latter that can lead to excess volatility in markets, and thus
will be the focus in this paper. In addition, according to Devenow and Welch (1996) herding
behavior is not necessarily in conflict with rational behavior, which is an underlying assumption
in the EMH. Investors may rationally herd in the direction of others who they believe are better
informed, thus engage in optimal decision-making, and money managers may rationally herd to
maintain their reputation and position. In addition, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) note that mar-
ket efficiency does not mean perfect foresight; a fully rational market may react to information
that the investor has failed to perceive. However, some phenomena in asset pricing are difficult
to explain rationally, indicating that share prices are affected by irrational investors ignoring
their own information and blindly following other’s decisions (Chang et al., 2000).
2.2 Institutional Herding
The market consists of both professionals and non-professionals, where professionals tend to herd
to avoid underperforming their peers, and non-professionals herd because they are less informed
on market conditions (Shiller, 2003). According to Scharfstein and Stein (1990), professional
managers will follow the herd if they are concerned about their reputation, and the compensation
scheme and terms of employment for money managers are often such that imitation, i.e. herd
behavior, is rewarded. More specifically, managers that follow the herd can share the blame
if they make an unprofitable decision and thus reduce their significant risk of being dismissed,
because external observers conclude that the bad outcome occurred by chance (Lakonishok et al.,
1992). This confirms the quotation by Keynes (1936): ‘it is better to fail conventionally than to
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succeed unconventionally’. Although this behavior is rational from the perspective of managers,
it is inefficient from a market standpoint because the money managers herd towards the first
managers’ decisions, not revealing their private information. A way to test for herd behavior
among money managers is to examine if decisions of professional money managers are more
closely correlated over time compared to the decisions of private investors who are unconcerned
about their reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). However, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) note
that correlated individuals are most likely just influenced by common information from some
noisy variable on trades.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) suggest that herding might be more prevalent among institutions than
among individuals, because institutional investors know more about each other’s trades than
individuals do, and because the signals reaching institutions are more correlated. The authors
point out that herding among institutions can have a stabilizing effect if the investors all react
to the same fundamental information, or if they all respond to the same irrational individual
investor moves, resulting in a more efficient market. This is related to the previously described
rational herding, indicating that institutions are in a better position to evaluate fundamentals
because they are exposed to a variety of news reports and analyses.
In their study, Lakonishok et al. (1992) find little evidence of herding among money managers,
concluding that professionals possibly use a variety of trading styles, resulting in uncorrelated
trading decisions. In addition, it may be a better chance of detecting herd behavior among
managers at a more aggregate level, since they may be better able to observe actions at this
level. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) point out that the reputational approach can also make some
money managers intentionally deviate from the industry benchmark, especially very good or
very poor managers daring to choose a risky project.
2.3 Information Cascades
In relation to herd behavior, several authors describe the concept of information cascades (see
e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000), that is, herd behavior arising from informational dif-
ferences. According to Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) herd behavior is defined as “converge in
behavior”, while information cascading means “ignoring private information signals”. Informa-
tion cascades occur when the decisions of investors acting early influence the actions of the
majority, making individuals ignore their own private information. This definition makes such
behavior idiosyncratic because random events combined with the choices of the first few investors
determine what individuals will herd on (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). This will increase
the volatility in the market, especially if it becomes clear that the first investors made the wrong
decision, resulting in people herding in the opposite direction.
Once a cascade starts, only the investment decision of early investors is reflected in the asset
prices. So although the prices in the market reflect all public information, the price does not
reveal the private information of all investors, in theory resulting in a complete ’information
blockage’, but more presumably resulting in unduly slow information aggregation (Hirshleifer
and Teoh, 2003). This means that poor decisions will be made in the market, even if the signals
possessed by the participants could be assembled to determine the right decision, because these
signals are not revealed and reflected in the prices. Individuals understand perfectly well that
the information in the market is inadequate, but they rather privately optimize than take into
account their effects upon the public information pool (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). One way to
prevent a cascade is that the participants in the market use a variety of decision rules, providing
a greater diversity of actions after a cascade starts.
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) remark that if there is uncertainty regarding the accuracy of in-
formation in the markets, informational cascades can arise even when investors are rational.
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Specifically, investors having very noisy information will herd, often mistakenly believing that
most other investors have accurate information. Also, if there are limits to the investors’ atten-
tion, or the information that they receive is hard to process, the investors may be pressed to
join an information cascade and thus engage in imperfect rationality. Still, fully rational models
of cascades or herding cannot explain the anomalous evidence regarding excess volatility. To
explain such return patterns, market imperfections or failures in human rationality must be
included.
2.4 Positive-Feedback Trading
A concept closely related to herd behavior is feedback trading, defined by Nofsinger and Sias
(1999) as a special case of herding resulting when variables correlated with lag returns, such as
decisions of previous traders, act as a common signal for investors. Positive-feedback trading,
or trend chasing, is a trading strategy driven by a concept from the behavioral literature; the
belief that trends are likely to continue. Such behavior can lead to investors buying overpriced
stocks and selling underpriced stocks, contributing to a further divergence of prices away from
fundamentals (Lakonishok et al., 1992). Positive-feedback trading can be explained by loss
aversion, making investors herd to past winners and away from past losers, or by managers
following the herd to protect their reputation. Such behavior may eventually lead to a price
bubble, as explained earlier. At the same time, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) emphasize that
positive-feedback strategies may be rational if the participants are exploiting the persistence of
returns observed in the market when new information arrives.
At any level of herding, individuals are more likely to destabilize prices if they follow strong
positive-feedback strategies (Lakonishok et al., 1992). Destabilization of prices increase the
long-run price volatility, since prices move away from their fundamental value, so positive-
feedback trading have the potential to explain the excess volatility observed in financial markets
(Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Even if only small amounts of herding and positive-feedback are
detected, one cannot rule out the possibility of large price impacts from the trading strategies.
However, positive-feedback trading is not necessarily a destabilizing strategy in the cases where
stocks underreact to news, and it can in some cases be explained as a response to recent price
increases, without necessarily causing these increases. From their analysis, both Lakonishok
et al. (1992) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find evidence for institutional investors’ engaging
in herding and positive-feedback trading only for small stocks, while the trading strategies for
large stocks are probably most important since they constitute the bulk of most holdings and
trading.
2.5 Market Stress and Price Bubbles
Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) among others, suggest that the formation
of herds is more likely during periods of market stress. During extreme market movements,
individuals are more prone to suppress their own private information in favour of the market
consensus, creating a clustering of individual returns around the market return. Thus, herd
behavior can also be defined as a contagious emotional response to stressful events, especially
when a critical number of individuals have a particular behavior, leading to a tipping in favor
of one behavior versus another (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). In addition, Christie and Huang
(1995) assume that herd behavior is a very short-lived phenomenon and that herding responds
asymmetrically to extreme market movements. These assumptions are confirmed in several
empirical studies of herding (e.g. Chang et al., 2000). Chiang and Zheng (2010) also find that a
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crisis can trigger herding activity in the country of origin, and then produce a contagion effect
spreading the crisis to neighbouring countries.
In his paper, Shiller (2003) suggests that if the herd behavior is not interrupted, the prices
of an asset will continue to deviate from its fundamental value, i.e. equilibrium, and over a
longer time period this may produce a speculative price bubble. It is common to assume that
price bubbles arise because of investors’ speculative behavior, but Hott (2009) shows in his
paper that price bubbles can arise merely because of herding behavior without any speculative
incentives involved. The price bubble can be caused by institutional investors that after a herd
year continues to practice destabilizing behavior for several years (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999), and
irrational private investors who do not react to informative signals, but to the market ‘mood’,
believing that they are receiving a positive signal when the market mood increases. Eventually,
such positive-feedback trading creates an unsustainable overvaluation of the assets, leading to a
bursting of the price bubble. The consequences of herding behavior, pulling stock prices away
from their equilibrium values and creating bubbles, are often causing substantial damage to a
country’s economy and investors (Balcilar et al., 2013).
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3 Empirical analysis of Herding
The literature review presented in the previous section provides possible explanations of herding
and situations when herd behavior is likely to occur. It is evident that there are several reasons
why investors participate in herd behavior, both institutional and private market actors, and it
is also important to note that herd behavior is not necessarily irrational. Still, the theory cannot
give a clear answer to the extent of actual herd behavior in financial markets. To be able to
answer this, it is necessary to develop methodologies for testing of herd behavior and perform
empirical analyses. In the last decades, there has been increased interest and research in this
area, and a selection of the most acknowledged methodologies and analyses is presented in this
section.
Empirical analysis of herding behavior has received attention in studies examining the group
behavior of investors in financial markets. This is based on the possible consequences of such
behavior; markets failing to make the market price and fundamental value converge, resulting
in greater instability and inefficiency. Chang et al. (2000) emphasize the implication of finding
evidence of herding for investment strategies, namely that a larger number of assets must be
included in a portfolio in order to achieve the same degree of diversification than in an otherwise
normal market. Most empirical studies of herd behavior measure whether clustering of decisions
is taking place in securities markets, using a pure statistical approach. An important challenge
to empirical work on herding is to separate it from correlation in trades, resulting from some
external factor independently influencing investors’ actions in parallel without any interaction
between the market participants (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).
3.1 The CSSD and CSAD Models
Extensive research has investigated the level of herding behavior in developed and undeveloped
markets. One of the first papers to perform empirical studies on a market is written by Christie
and Huang (1995), who introduce a new measure of herding and applies it on the US market.
Their test for herding relies on the assumption that because dispersion quantifies the average
proximity of individual returns to the mean, the presence of herd behavior is revealed when
individual returns follow the lead of the portfolio returns. Specifically, they look for herding
by testing whether securities’ return dispersions are significantly lower than average during
periods of extreme market movements, and this is done by performing a linear regression on
the dispersion related to the extreme tails of the returns distribution. The rationale is that
individuals are more likely to suppress their own beliefs in favor of the market consensus in
periods of market stress, and thus herds are more likely to form in these periods. The study of
Christie and Huang (1995) finds evidence for asymmetric behavior of dispersion during times of
market stress, but no evidence of significant herding in the US market, concluding that herding
is not an important factor in determining equity returns during periods of market stress.
Chang et al. (2000) extends the work of Christie and Huang (1995). They continue to examine
the relationship between equity dispersion and the overall market return, measured as cross-
sectional absolute deviation, but proposes a more powerful approach that uses a non-linear
regression specification. Their model is called the Cross Sectional Absolute Deviation Model
(abbreviated CSAD), and is used as a foundation in several later empirical studies. They also
examine herding in an international context by extending the data to include both developed
and developing financial markets. Chang et al. (2000) find evidence of herding in the two
emerging countries, South Korea and Taiwan, partial evidence for Japan and no evidence for the
developed countries, US and Hong Kong. The differences between market conditions may partly
be the result of incomplete information disclosure in the emerging markets, where macroeconomic
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information tends to play a significant greater role in the decision making process of market
participants (Chang et al., 2000).
3.2 Extending the CSAD Model
Chiang and Zheng (2010) are the first to examine herding behavior across national borders,
arguing that financial markets are somehow interdependent, especially during high-volatility
periods. The paper uses a modified version of the approach applied by Chang et al. (2000),
testing the cross-sectional stock return dispersions in relation to a set of explanatory variables,
including absolute domestic stock returns and foreign market influences. Chiang and Zheng
(2010) also test specifically for herding during turbulent periods, based on the suggestion by
Christie and Huang (1995) that herding will be more prevalent during periods of market stress.
Their results confirm this theory by finding evidence of herding activity triggered by market
crises.
Following the approach of Chang et al. (2000), Chiang et al. (2010) examine herding behavior of
investors in Chinese stock markets. The authors separate the market in A-share investors and B-
share investors to test the hypothesis that foreign or institutional investors (B-share investors)
are more rational and have diverse information to assess. The results confirm that herding
behavior in the A-share market is more consistent, since it consists of local investors who tend
to herd due to lack of fundamental information, and that B-share investors herd only during
down markets. Chiang et al. (2010) also employ a quantile regression on the data, to include
information about the tails of the returns distribution and thus create more robust results. The
quantile regression provides a more complete picture of the conditional distribution between
return dispersion and independent variables. Herding activity is observed in lower quantiles for
periods of market stress, and the B-share markets appear to be more variable conditional on
different quantiles, suggesting that using a mean level of the data to examine herding behavior
may produce a deceptive statistical inference.
Saastamoinen (2008) also builds on the standard methodology of Chang et al. (2000) by using
quantile regression in his empirical analysis. He argues that quantile regression enables the ex-
amination of effects in different points of the market returns distribution, such as the median
and extreme quantiles, and that quantile regression may be more efficient when the distribution
of errors is non-normal. In his paper, Saastamoinen (2008) study the market in Finland, charac-
terized as a remote stock exchange suffering from low liquidity, arguing that such a market more
easily triggers herd behavior. From his analysis, Saastamoinen (2008) find evidence of herding
in the lower tail of the stock return distribution, but he emphasizes that a possible explanation
for his results could also be, for example, correlated adjustments to new information.
Lao and Singh (2011) look for evidence of herding behavior in the Chinese and Indian stock
markets. These markets are characterized as inefficient, having low standards of information
disclosure. Consequently, investors may be inclined to herd towards perceived informed investors,
leading to abnormal volatility in the markets. The paper uses the method proposed by Chang
et al. (2000), adjusted with AR(1) to avoid auto-correlated time-series data which can lead to
inaccurate estimation of the coefficients. Lao and Singh (2011) measure herding during extreme
market conditions, increasing and decreasing markets and high and low volume state. They
also try to capture the effect of the global financial crisis, confirming that herding behavior may
occur when uncertainty in the market is high. The study finds that herding behavior is present
in both the Chinese and Indian stock markets, and that it is greater during extreme market
conditions.
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3.3 Other Empirical measures of Herd Behavior
Balcilar et al. (2013) proposes a dynamic herding approach, testing for herding under regime
switching and with concentration on the Gulf Arab stock markets. The study suggests that these
frontier markets have a different structure than developed markets, and that the market can be
divided into three regimes; low, high and extreme or crash volatility. The authors estimate
a three-state Markov-switching model for the cross-sectional dispersion of stock returns in the
stock markets, and examine the relationship between the market returns and return dispersions
during different market regimes. The final part of the study looks into cross-market effects
and examines possible herding spillover effects in the markets. This is similar to what was
done in the study by Chiang and Zheng (2010), but in this case regime switching is included.
The regime-based tests yield significant evidence of herding under the crash regime for all of
the markets except Qatar which herds under the high volatility regime, and the cross-market
herding analysis supports herding co-movements and not spillovers.
A new approach to detect and measure herding is proposed by Hwang and Salmon (2004), and it
is based on the cross-sectional dispersion of the factor sensitivity of assets within a given market.
The approach is called the state space model, and is similar to Christie and Huang (1995) to
the extent that it exploits the information held in the cross-sectional movements of the market.
However, the state space model focuses on the cross-sectional variability of factor sensitivities
rather than returns, which makes it free from the influence of idiosyncratic components and
allows for herding during not only periods of extreme market movements. Hwang and Salmon
(2004) apply the model to an analysis of herding in the US and South Korean stocks markets,
and find evidence of herding towards the market portfolio in both up and down markets for both
markets.
Demirer et al. (2010) study the Taiwanese market, representing an emerging yet relatively so-
phisticated market, and they also look for herding evidence within each specific industry in the
market. They find that the linear model proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) provides no
evidence of investor herds, while the results from the non-linear model proposed by Chang et al.
(2000) provide support for herding, and that the herding effect is more prominent during periods
of market losses. Demirer et al. (2010) also employ the state space model suggested by Hwang
and Salmon (2004), including two control variables; market volatility and market return. The
results from this model further support the results from the non-linear model, indicating robust
evidence for herding in Taiwan, and implying that herding in the Taiwanese stock market can
occur under normal market periods in addition to periods of market stress.
Another alternative approach to test for herding behavior, presented by Bhaduri and Mahapatra
(2013), uses symmetric properties of the cross-sectional return distribution to identify herding.
The methodology is based on the idea that the security returns tend to be more symmetric
towards the market return under herding, and more specifically it uses the cross-sectional ab-
solute mean-median difference to capture the symmetry of ensemble return distribution. The
symmetry in the cross sectional distribution would imply that this difference would tend to zero
and the lack of linear relation between this difference and the market return is used to identify
herding. The argument for this proposed measure is that it is less prone to the presence of
securities with extreme returns in the portfolio, and hence provides a more reliable measure
of herding. The empirical test performed by Bhaduri and Mahapatra (2013) examine herding
on the Indian equity market, and the results provide evidence of the presence of herd behavior
during periods of extreme price movements.
Following many others, Chen et al. (2004) investigate the issue of herding behavior through
returns, but they also include a trading volume perspective. Inspired by Christie and Huang
(1995) they use cross-sectional dispersion to test for herding, focusing on idiosyncratic returns
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instead of total returns. In addition, Chen et al. (2004) argue that trading volume in the market
provides important information in a different dimension than returns, and is a necessary condi-
tion for the existence of herding behavior. Accordingly, they test if the cross-sectional dispersion
is negatively correlated with trading volume, while pointing out that increased information flow
could affect the results. In the empirical analysis, Chen et al. (2004) study the Chinese stock
market, claiming that its institutional characteristics provide a unique perspective to study herd
behavior due to the separation between domestic and foreign investors. From the empirical
test, Chen et al. (2004) find evidence supporting the presence of herding behavior in China, in
particularly for foreign participants, suggesting that in the presence of inefficient information
disclosure, foreigners tend to herd due to lack of fundamental and private information on firms.
Chen et al. (2004) also find strong support for herding activities when trading volume is involved
and informational effects are controlled for.
3.4 Combining Herd Behavior and Positive-Feedback Trading
Lakonishok et al. (1992) examine trading patterns of institutional investors, focusing on the
prevalence of herding and positive-feedback trading. They test for herding by assessing the
degree of correlation across money managers in buying and selling a given stock, indicating
that individual herding is present if money managers tend to end up on the same side of the
market in a given stock. In addition, herding is tested by examining the fraction of purchasing
behavior of an individual money manager that can be explained by the actions of others. For
the analysis of positive-feedback trading, Lakonishok et al. (1992) looks at excess demand, and
their test examines the relationship between money managers’ demand for a stock and the past
performance of that stock. The tests are done on pension funds in the NYSE, justified by the fact
that there is more scope of finding herding and positive-feedback trading in homogenous groups
where each member faces a similar decision problem, and each member can observe the actions
of other members in the group. From the results, Lakonishok et al. (1992) find weak evidence for
herding and somewhat stronger evidence for positive feedback-trading in smaller stocks, and no
evidence in larger stocks. This can be explained by the fact that there is less public information
about these stocks, and that money managers dump poorly-performing stocks to improve the
appearance of their portfolios. At the same time, herding clearly leads to correlated trading,
but the reverse need not to be true (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000).
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) perform a similar analysis as Lakonishok et al. (1992), evaluating
herding in the NYSE by looking at increases and decreases in institutional ownership resulting
from institutional investors herding to a stock or individual investors herding away from a stock.
In the study, the authors attempt to differentiate the ’price impact’ of herding from intraperiod
positive-feedback trading, and their results suggest that institutional investors’ herding impacts
prices to a greater extent than individual investors’, and/or that the institutional investors
engage in positive-feedback trading to a greater extent. Their results show that there is a strong
positive relation between returns and annual changes in institutional ownership, interpreting this
as evidence of positive-feedback trading among institutional investors. Still, Nofsinger and Sias
(1999) point out that the change in fractional institutional ownership may not reflect herding,
but rather an investor taking a large position in a security.
3.5 Measurement Problems
The results from the empirical studies presented above show some evidence of herding behavior
in stock markets. The model proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) does not reveal any strong
evidence of herding, while the non-linear expansion of this model, the CSAD model, provides
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some positive results. By extending the CSADmodel with quantile regression or lagged variables,
several later studies find more evidence of herding. In other studies, various measures of herding
have been developed presenting somewhat positive results, in particular when trading volume is
included. Some studies have also included a test for positive-feedback trading, a concept that is
linked to herd behavior, and find stronger evidence for this. Much of the empirical research on
herding behavior has been done in the context of developing countries. In these countries, one is
likely to find a greater tendency of herding, due to a lack of sufficient investment opportunities
and because rapid and accurate information is hard and costly to obtain (Balcilar et al., 2013).
It is also important to note that many studies look for evidence of a particular form of herding,
and the absence of evidence supporting this form does not imply that other types of herding do
not exist.
Two reasons for possible understating of herd behavior are: (1) that the trading volumes are
too low for certain stock markets and periods, and (2) that the investors considered are too
heterogeneous (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). When performing empirical studies on herd
behavior in markets, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find the particular motive behind a trade
that is not driven by fundamental laws in the EMH. According to Bikhchandani and Sharma
(2000), it may be possible to separate out unintentional herding by allowing for changes in
’fundamentals’, but further differentiation among the causes of herding from an analysis of a
data set on asset holdings and price changes is challenging. This means that there is a lack
of a direct link between herd behavior theory and the empirical specifications used for testing,
and it is hard to distinguish intentional herding from participants’ common responses to publicly
known information. To be able to examine herd behavior correctly, proprietary information from
the investors on their investment strategies is required, but to keep the markets functioning in a
proper way, this information cannot be published – and so proper examination of herd behavior
in stock markets will remain difficult.
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4 Methodology and Data
This section presents the methodologies that have been used in this study and the data that has
been analysed
4.1 CSSD and CSAD
In 1995, Christie and Huang introduced a method to detect the existence of herd behavior in
equity returns. They proposed that individual stock returns dispersions from the overall market
return is predicted to be relatively low when herding behavior occurs. The rationale behind
this argument is based on evidence from social psychology on the behavior of individuals in
groups. The evidence suggests that even when a decision conducted by a group is perceived as
wrong by an individual, the individual often suppress his own beliefs and follows the group’s
decision. When translating this into investments decision making, herding will be present when
individuals do their investments based solely on the action of the overall market, and without
considering their own fundamentals. The method Christie and Huang (1995) employed is based
on cross-sectional standard deviations of returns (CSSD), and it will be the first method used
in this study. The dispersion measure is defined as:
CSSDt =
√∑N
i=1(Ri,t −Rm,t)2
N − 1 (4.1)
where Ri,t is the observed return on stock i at time t, Rm,t is the market return, and N is the
number of stocks in the portfolio.
According to Christie and Huang (1995), herd behavior will be most visible during periods of
market stress, or extreme market moves. This is because during such periods individual se-
curities’ returns are more likely to cluster around the market return, since there is a higher
probability that investors suppress their own private information in favor of market consensus.
Christie and Huang (1995) use the following regression to test for herding under such circum-
stances:
CSSDt = α+ β1D
L
t + β2D
U
t + t (4.2)
where α describe the average dispersion of the sample excluding the region covered by the
dummy variables (β1, β2). DLt and DUt takes the value one if the return of the market portfolio
on day t lies in the extreme lower (L) or upper (U) tail of the return distribution, and zero
otherwise.
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), representing the rational market model, predicts that
the dispersion of individual securities will increase with the absolute value of market return. The
increase is given by the CAPM beta coefficient (β), reflecting the tendency of security’s returns
to respond to swings in the market. By the same analogy, the rational asset pricing model
predicts that the coefficients for the dummy variables (β1, β2) will be significantly positive in
periods of market stress, since the dummy variables are designed to capture the differences in
investor behavior during extreme market moves versus normal market (Chiang et al., 2010).
This contradicts the theory of herd behavior, which predicts statistically significant negative
values for the coefficient of β1 and β2 during such periods, as investors will herd towards the
market return.
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One of the challenges with Christie and Huang’s theory is the definition of extreme returns.
They use 1% and 5% in their study, but emphasize that this choice is relatively arbitrary since
there is no correct definition of what extreme market return is. This stems from the fact that
investors differ in what they see as an extreme return (Chiang et al., 2010). Another challenge
with CSSD is that the methodology only captures herding during extreme market moves, while
herding may occur to some extent over the whole sample period, only being more visible during
market stress. The final challenge with CSSD is its sensitivity to outliners, which may affect the
reliability of the results.
The next method applied in this study was proposed by Chang et al. in 2000. They use
the cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) as an alternative measure of dispersion. This
method corrects the second challenge with CSSD, i.e. that CSSD is a very stringent test and
therefore requires the dispersion to be far from linear to detect herding, which only occurs during
periods of market stress (Chang et al., 2000). Instead of just testing for herding during extreme
market conditions (lower and upper tail), the methodology suggested by Chang et al. (2000) is
constructed to detect herding over the entire distribution of market returns. CSAD is defined
as:
CSADt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Ri,t −Rm,t| (4.3)
From equations (4.1) and (4.3), it can be seen that the formula for CSSD assigns a much higher
weight to large deviations from the market returns than to small because each divergence is
squared, while the CSAD formula gives a proportional weight to each deviation according to
deviation size.
Christie and Huang (1995) challenged the rational asset pricing model when it comes to its
statement about increasing dispersion between individual securities and market portfolio return.
Chang et al. (2000) challenge the CAPM assumption further by claiming that the linear and
increasing relation between equity return dispersion and market return will not hold under
periods of market stress. Instead, a non-linear increasing or even decreasing relation can be
detected between the dispersion and market return. Hence, they proposed an alternate test
of herding, which include an additional regression parameter to capture any non-linearity, and
therefore the test is based on a quadratic relationship between CSADt and Rm,t:
CSADt = α+ γ1|Rm,t|+ γ2R2m,t + t (4.4)
The non-linear relationship will be reflected by a statistical significant and negative value of
γ2, and this non-linear relation will indicate the existence of herding. A positive γ2 will either
indicate that the regression is not able to capture herding due to incorrect premises, or that the
CAPM is not completely valid in the Norwegian market.
4.1.1 Herding during other Market Conditions
Herding may be asymmetric under different market conditions, so it can be useful to divide the
data into subsets. The regression model in equation (4.4) restricts γ1 to be the same for both
down and up market, i.e. no asymmetry allowed. To allow for asymmetric herding, equation
(4.4) can be rewritten to the following equations:
CSADDownt = α+ γ1|Rm,t| ∗DLt + γ2R2m,t ∗DLt + t if Rm,t < 0 (4.5)
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CSADUpt = α+ γ1|Rm,t| ∗DUt + γ2R2m,t ∗DUt + t if Rm,t > 0 (4.6)
where DLt = 1, if the market return lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution on day t,
otherwise 0, and DLt = 1, if the market return lies in the extreme upper tail of the distribution
on day t, otherwise 0.
4.1.2 Quantile Regression
In the previous section different methods to detect herding have been explored. A common aspect
of these methods is that the regression line passes through the average or ’center of gravity’ of
the points. Quantile regression (QR) models allows one to see far more than is possible using
a simple regression. The difference between a general regression and QR is that the regression
line in a quantile regression will pass through a quantile of the points rather than the mean of
the sample (Alexander, 2008). Therefore, by finding several quantile regression lines, a more
complete picture of the return distribution and the relation between CSADt and Rm,t will be
given. Consequently, QR explores the issue that herding behavior may be sensitive to a certain
quantile of stock dispersions. QR also solves the problem regarding what the rightfully definition
of extreme market returns are, since it provides a tool for estimating the effects on the dependent
variable over the entire return distribution. QR is a more efficient and robust estimation method
compared to the ordinary least squares (OLS) method for several reasons. For instance, QR is
more efficient when the distribution of regression errors is non-normal, and financial data does
not usually pass the test of normality (Saastamoinen, 2008). Also, OLS focuses on the mean
as a measure of location and lacks information about the tails of a distribution, meaning that
extreme news in financial markets can significantly affect the tail values and thus distort the
estimated results, while QR is robust to the presence of outliers (Chiang et al., 2010). Using the
notation introduced by Chiang et al. (2010), quantile regressions for estimating CSADt and a
set of explanatory variables, Xt, for τ quantiles are characterized as:
CSADt(τ |x) = ατ + γ1,τ |Rm,t|+ γ2,τR2m,t + t,τ (4.7)
In equation (4.7), Xt represents a vector of the right-hand-side variables in the equation. With
this method, the conditional distribution of the dependent variable CSADt is characterized by
different values of the τ th quantile. When τ = 0.5, the QR becomes the median regression.
4.2 Herding based on excessive turnover
In this section, an alternative approach to detect herding behavior will be presented. It is built on
the hypothesis that herding will lead to increased trading volume in individual stocks. So far, the
methods used have been based on the assumption that a change in prices is a plausible condition
for the existence of herding, but Chen et al. (2004) noted that it is not a necessary condition.
Trading volume, in contrast, is an essential premise for the existence of herding behavior, since
it is a voluntary coordinated action (Chen et al., 2004). According to Bessembinder et al. (1996)
trading volume is not always required for price formation, i.e. price reactions can occur without
trading volume, implying that a measure of herding solely based on prices will have several
biases that can be overcome by the inclusion of volume measures. Therefore, the new approach
will use volume, specifically turnover, to investigate herd behavior. Another feature of this new
approach is that the focus will be on individual shares aggregated over time. This is based on
the close relation between volume and firm-specific information that is found by Bessembinder
et al. (1996).
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From the assumptions above, a new test for herd behavior based on idiosyncratic returns and
abnormal turnover for individual stocks is introduced, called the IR model. The test consists
of two parts, where the first part is based on the intuition that abnormal turnovers will be
autocorrelated in the case of herding in the markets. This is because trading volume due to the
earlier actions of some investors can serve as a common signal that other investors can follow,
with the belief that it is in their best interest to follow the crowd. The second part of the test,
also the main part, is based on the comprehension that the idiosyncratic return for an individual
stock will move in the opposite direction of abnormal turnover when herding occurs.
Part I:
The first step is to estimate abnormal trading volume for each share, using a ’market model’
regression for volume proposed by Ferris et al. (1987):
Vit = Ai +BiVmt + eit (4.8)
where
Vit =
Number of shares of stock i traded on day t
Total number of shares of stock i outstanding on day t
Vmt =
Number of shares of all stocks traded on day t
Total number of shares of all stocks outstanding on day t
eit = Abnormal turnover for stock i on day t
eit is interpreted as the fraction of the outstanding stock of i, traded on day t after removing
the effects of market-wide events (Ferris et al., 1987).
Next, autocorrelation in the abnormal turnover is measured by the regression:
eit = ρ1 + ρ2eit−1 + µ (4.9)
Where autocorrelation is detected if ρ2 is positive and significant.
After measuring the autocorrelation in the abnormal turnover, the first part of the test is done.
If the autocorrelation is significant and positive, herding might be present in the firm and the
second part of the test should be executed.
Part II:
The main method for detecting herd behavior is based on the assumption that when herding
occurs, individual investors usually suppress their own firm-specific information, resulting in a
more uniform change in security returns. The result is a reduced level of individual security
returns in relation to the market.
Inspired by the work of Chen et al. (2004), a measure of idiosyncratic returns (IR) for each
individual share is proposed:
IRit = |it|
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where it is the idiosyncratic return from a market model7. By using idiosyncratic return, it
is possible to separate out the returns that cannot be explained by common factors in the
market.
It is important to note that an increase in information flow could also lead to a high trading
volume. This will be refered to as ’informational trading’, which is trading resulting from
differential information among investors. According to Bessembinder et al. (1996), differences
in traders’ private information will increase trading volume and the dispersion measure, e.g.
the opposite prediction of herd behavior. Therefore, to account for the informational effect, an
additional variable will be used to measure the change in abnormal turnover.
To detect herd behavior, the following empirical model is suggested:
IRit = α+ β1IRit−1 + β2eit + β3∆eit + err. (4.10)
The regression is performed for each year of the data period. By doing this, it is possible to
remove some of the noise from daily trading values, while still being able to analyze variation
in herding in relation to overall market behavior over time. The lagged IR variable is used to
control for autocorrelation in the residual.
The prediction for herding behavior, controlled for informational trading, calls for a negative β2
and a positive β3.
There are some limitations to the model that needs to be mentioned. The most obvious weakness
when it comes to a measure of herd behavior in relation to volume, is that trading volumes in
financial markets are determined by several factors, such as (i) traders’ exogenous liquidity needs,
(ii) public and private information flows and (iii) cross-sectional differences in agents’ beliefs and
opinions regarding value and their interpretation of common signals. Obviously, it is difficult to
separate these factors from each other.
In addition, it can be noted that trading volume is not normally distributed, but that log-
transformed volume adheres more closely to the properties of the normal distribution (Bessem-
binder et al., 1996). Therefore, to account for a possible heteroscedasticity in the residual,
log-transformed values can be used in the regression.
4.3 Data
Using the methodologies introduced above, herding in the Norwegian stock market will now be
investigated using daily end-of-day stock prices and volume data. There will be four different
sets of data that will be analyzed, and all the data is obtained from the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE). The timeframe for the data used is from January 2000 to December 2013.
The first set of data consists of 54 individual shares during the period 03.01.00 to 28.06.138.
The period covers the dotcom bubble in early 2000 and the financial crisis, and will therefore
represent both a bear and bull market. The shares used in the sample have been or still are a
part of the OBX index over the given period. The OBX index consists of the 25 most traded,
and thus the largest and most liquid, stocks on the Norwegian Stock Exchange. However, since
not all shares in the OBX have been part of the index over the entire period, the least liquid
stocks and the stocks that have been a part of the OBX for a short time have been removed
from the data set.
7In this case, the idiosyncratic return is the residual from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
8A complete list of the stocks can be found in the appendix.
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The second sample of data consists of stocks that were listed on Oslo Stock Exchange during
the financial crisis and were still listed by 31.08.13. In this paper, the financial crisis is set
to the period from January 2008 to December 2010. In the third set of data, the stocks from
the second dataset that were a part of one of the five largest sectors on OSE as of 31.08.13
are separated into their respective sector. The five largest sectors are: Energy, Industrials,
Information Technology, Finance and Consumer Staples. The final sample of data is the thirty
smallest firms by equity value as of January 2014 that were listed on Oslo Stock Exchange from
January 2010 to December 2013.
To use the first two methods presented above, a parameter that represents the overall market
performance is needed. In this paper, the Norwegian equity market will be presented by the
OSEAX index. This is an index that consists of all the shares on Oslo Stock Exchange, and is
therefore the best representation of the market. In Figure 4.1, OSEAX is shown for the sample
period.
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5 Results
This section presents the results from the empirical analysis. Four different data sets have been
analyzed using the methodologies presented in section 4. Both CSSD and CSAD have been
applied to the first dataset containing the OBX shares. For the sample covering the financial
crisis and the sector sample, only the CSAD approach has been used. Finally, the IR model has
been applied to the sample consisting of the thirty smallest firm on OSE.
5.1 Results from the OBX
In the investigation of herding in the OBX, the main results for the selection of 54 stocks that
are or have been a part of OBX during the period from January 3, 2000 to June 28, 2013 will
be presented.
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the Norwegian equity market
Statistics CSSD CSAD
Median 0.02581 0.01810
Mean 0.02959 0.01988
Max 0.21251 0.07921
Min 0.01001 0.00779
Variance 0.00022 0.00006
St.dev 0.01474 0.00777
Skewness 3.25496 1.83193
Kurtosis 23.2748 5.71082
Jarque-bera 64261.6 2944,92
ADF -6.044441 -4.766662
Observations 3385 3385
1p-value: 0.0100
2p-value: 0.0100
In Table 1, the univariate statistics for the CSSD and CSAD of returns for Norway is reported.
For CSSD, the value ranges from a low of 1.0% to a high of 21.3%, and for CSAD the values are
0.8% and 7.9% respectively. So the CSAD has a smaller span. In general, the CSSD and CSAD
have small volatilities, but CSSD is characterized by a slightly higher magnitude of standard
deviation having a value of 1.5% compared to 0.8% for CSAD. A low standard deviation may
suggest that there are few unusual cross-sectional variations due to unexpected news in the
market (Chiang and Zheng, 2010). In addition, the calculation of the average CSSD is higher
than the average for CSAD, suggesting higher market variations when using the CSSD model.
Moreover, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) indicates that both series are stationary at
every significance level.
5.1.2 Results from the CSSD Model
Durbin-Watson testing of the first data analysis shows that the time-series seems to be auto-
correlated. Consequently, the subsequent analyses and the results presented in the next sections
are adjusted for autocorrelation with AR(1).
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Table 2 provides the regression estimates for the CSSD model in equation (4.1) for the overall
sample. The upper and lower one and five percentiles of the market return is used to represent
market stress. The first column presents results under the 1% criterion for extreme returns, and
the second column presents results under the 5% criterion. The estimates of β1 and β2 for both
criteria are positive, and the p-values confirm that the coefficients are statistically significant.
This implies that the return dispersion tend to increase during extreme price movements. These
findings are consistent with Christie and Huang (1995), and as mentioned in section 4, these
results contradict their definition of herd behavior which requires a decrease in dispersion levels.
Rather, in this analysis the dispersions are higher than average during days characterized by
extreme returns, as predicted by the rational asset pricing model, i.e. CAPM. It is most apparent
for the 1% criterion, as it produces higher estimates for β1 and β2, but at the same time, the
beta coefficients for the 5% criterion are estimated with more observations compared to the 1%
criterion.
Table 2: Regression results for cross-sectional standard deviation
1% Criterion 5% Criterion
Coefficients CSSD Coefficients CSSD
α
0.01557
(0.0000)*** α
0.01518
(0.0000)***
β1
0.01737
(0.0000)*** β1
0.00900
(0.0000)***
β2
0.01817
(0.0000)*** β2
0.00933
(0.0000)***
AR(1) 0.46334(0.0000)*** AR(1)
0.45974
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
5.1.3 Results from the CSAD Model
The linear CSSD model fails to capture the possible non-linear correlation between individual
asset returns and the market return. In order to make a more comprehensive evaluation of the
level of herding in Norway, the non-linear CSAD model is utilized.
Table 3: Regression results for
cross-sectional absolute deviation
Coefficients CSAD
α
0.00567
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.18922
(0.0000)***
γ2
0.73066
(0.01360)*
AR(1) 0.60677(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
*Level of significance is within 5%
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The results in Table 3 show the parameter estimation from using the CSAD model over the entire
return sample, together with consistent p-values. The non-linear coefficient γ2 is significantly
positive within 5%, indicating an increasing relation between return dispersions and the market
return and thus implying that there is a low degree of herding in the Norwegian market. This
finding is consistent with the assumption that herding behavior is less present in developed
markets, and may be due to the increasing number of experienced investors in Norway and the
influence of institutional investors having better information sources. It is also found that the
coefficient on the linear term, |Rm,t|, i.e. γ1 is significantly positive, so that CSADt increases
with |Rm,t|.
5.1.4 Herding Behavior under Up and Down Markets
Table 4 represents estimation results for the CSAD-based model when the market is divided into
up and down state.
Table 4: Regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation in UP and DOWN markets
Up market Down market
Coefficients CSAD Coefficients CSAD
Panel A: 1% Criterion
α
0.00631
(0.0000)*** α
0.00634
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.18106
(0.0068)*** γ1
0.19770
(0.0063)**
γ2
0.30775
(0.7620) γ2
-0.10769
(0.9131)
AR(1) 0.67770(0.0000)*** AR(1)
0.67526
(0.0000)***
Panel B: 5% Criterion
α
0.0.00641
(0.0000)*** α
0.00642
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.12232
(0.0001)*** γ1
0.10989
(0.0001)***
γ2
1.21821
(0.0401)* γ2
1.11954
(0.0178)*
AR(1) 0.66521(0.0000)*** AR(1)
0.66267
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
**Level of significance is within 1.0%
*Level of significance is within 5.0%
The γ2 coefficient associated with DU captures the change in investor behavior associated with
extreme upward price movements, and the same concerns the γ2 coefficient associated with DL.
For the up market, γ2 is positive for both the 1% criterion and the 5% criterion. As mentioned
earlier, the positive coefficient is indicative of an increase in the CSAD measure, providing no
evidence for herd behavior. For the down market, the γ2 coefficient is negative at the 1%
criterion, but the corresponding p-value indicates that the result is not significant. The evidence
from Table 4 thus confirms the provisional conclusion that the model is unable to detect herding
in Norway. It is also of interest to compare the coefficients in the up and down markets to
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test the hypothesis that γUP1 = γDOWN1 and γUP2 = γDOWN2 , to examine whether the market
presents an asymmetric reaction at different market states. At the 5% extreme market criteria,
the rate of increase in the up market is larger than that of the down market, suggesting that the
dispersion in returns are on average wider in an up market day, relative to a down market day.
This represents an asymmetric reaction to good and bad macroeconomic news; however there is
still no clear proof of herding.
5.1.5 Quantile Regression
Table 5 contains regression estimates when using the quantile regression method. For instance,
setting τ = 90% corresponds to the top 10% of the high returns. The estimated statistics suggest
that the coefficient for γ2 is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1% level for the quantile
τ = 10%, positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for quantiles τ = 25%, τ = 50% and
τ = 75%, and negative but insignificant for the quantile τ = 90%. As previously discussed, this
implies that return dispersion increases under all market conditions, and accordingly provides
a larger foundation for the conclusion that Norwegian investors are less likely to herd. The
evidence in Table 5 also indicates that the estimated coefficient varies with the quantile levels.
The median quantile (τ = 50%) is close to the mean values of the least squares estimation that
has been used in the other testing herding equations in this section. The variation in coefficients
suggests that examining herding behavior using a mean or median level of the data may produce
a deceptive statistical inference. In addition, as noted earlier the quantile regression provides a
more complete picture of the conditional distribution between independent variables and return
dispersion (Alexander, 2008).
Table 5: Quantile regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation
Quantiles α γ1 γ2 AR(1)
τ = 10% 0.00444(0.0000)***
0.13849
(0.0000)***
0.94368
(0.0000)***
0.41777
(0.0000)***
τ = 25% 0.00491(0.0000)***
0.12922
(0.0000)***
1.56237
(0.0190)*
0.49732
(0.0000)***
τ = 50% 0.00551(0.0000)***
0.15110
(0.0000)***
1.31734
(0.0354)*
0.59896
(0.0000)***
τ = 75% 0.00599(0.0000)***
0.17596
(0.0000)***
1.18660
(0.0208)*
0.72501
(0.0000)***
τ = 90% 0.00685(0.0000)***
0.24455
(0.0000)***
-0.08296
(0.8644)
0.84151
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
*Level of significance is within 5.0%
5.1.6 Level of Herding during the Global Financial Crisis
This section will examine the hypothesis that the magnitude of herding behavior is higher during
the recent global financial crisis, because investors are more likely to herd when there is high
uncertainty in the market (see e.g. Christie and Huang, 1995). The global financial crisis made
the Norwegian market highly volatile and uncertain in the period from 2008 to 2010 as shown in
Figure 4.1. To capture the effect of the global financial crisis on OBX stocks, herding behavior
is measured during two different periods, covering a smaller and larger part of the crisis period,
and this is illustrated in Table 6. Panel A shows the results from the period January 2008 to
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December 2008, presenting an insignificant herding behavior through the coefficient for γ2. The
results in Panel B, presenting a positive and insignificant coefficient for γ2 supports the results
from Panel A. Thus, the testing approach finds no evidence for herding behavior in OBX during
the global financial crisis in Norway.
Table 6: Regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation during the financial crises
Panel A: Jan. 08 to Dec. 08 Panel B: Jan. 08 to Dec. 10
Coefficients CSAD Coefficients CSAD
α
0.00709
(0.0000)*** α
0.00564
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.06563
(0.4890) γ1
0.21370
(0.0000)***
γ2
-1.26346
(0.5920) γ2
0.53139
(0.2460)
AR(1) 0.73386(0.0000)*** AR(1)
0.59517
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
5.2 Results from the Norwegian Equity Market during the Global Financial
Crisis
When examining the stocks in the OBX, no evidence of herding is found. This does not nec-
essarily imply that herding does not exist in the Norwegian market. There are several possible
reasons why herding is not discovered so far in this paper: The model used may not capture the
type of herding that can form around other indicators than the market return, or an irrelevant
subset of the market is investigated.
Lao and Singh (2011) found that herding was more likely to appear during days of high trading
volume, suggesting that there is a higher probability of investors herding in a more liquid market.
Therefore, it is relevant to ask if the current interpretation of herding behavior in the Norwegian
market will change when a broader market perspective is introduced.
The stocks in the OBX index cover only the most liquid part of the Norwegian market. In
this section, the Norwegian equity market during the global financial crisis will be examined9.
Accordingly, not only the most liquid stocks will be included, but also less liquid stocks.
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 7, descriptive statistics for the Norwegian equity market during the financial crisis
is presented. CSAD range from 1.17% to 7.34%. These values deviate only slightly from the
OBX CSAD values, which is a little surprising, considering that this period covers the global
financial crisis. One would expect larger deviations for this period, since it was characterized by
stock prices dropping significantly from day to day. On the other hand, the analysis explores
a total of 144 shares on Oslo Stock Exchange during this period, and therefore there are more
stocks averaging out the results. The variance for this period is a little higher than for the OBX
CSAD variance, which is reasonable since the time period covered in this section is much shorter.
Moreover, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test indicates that the data is non-stationary at
9The data set only includes stocks that were still listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by 31.08.13.
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all significance levels. This means that the t-ratios might have severe bias (Alexander, 2008).
At the same time, the p-value is high, which indicates that this result is highly uncertain.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics
for the Norwegian equity market
Statistics CSAD
Median 0.02201
Mean 0.02510
Max 0.07342
Min 0.01168
Variance 0.00009
St.dev 0.00966
Skewness 1.80435
Kurtosis 3.64969
Jarque-bera 427.228
ADF -2.68111
Observations 753
Period: Jan. 2008 to Dec. 2010
1p-value: 0.2900
5.2.2 Results from the CSAD Model
The results in Table 8 are the parameter estimations from using the CSAD model on the Nor-
wegian equity market. In both panels the non-linear coefficient γ2 is positive and statistically
insignificant. This result reinforces the conclusion that when applying the CSAD model to the
Norwegian market, no evidence of herding is found.
Table 8: Regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation
Panel A: Jan. 08 to Dec. 08 Panel B: Jan. 08 to Dec. 10
Coefficients CSAD Coefficients CSAD
α
0.00742
(0.0000)*** α
0.00840
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.33025
(0.0000)*** γ1
0.37765
(0.0000)***
γ2
0.72725
(0.1430) γ2
0.35395
(0.2630)
AR(1) 0.47439(0.0000)*** AR(1)
0.42305
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
*Level of significance is within 5%
5.2.3 Quantile Regression
In Table 9, the results from quantile regression for the two respective periods are presented. For
the period from January 2008 to December 2008, the coefficient for γ2 is positive and statistically
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significant for the quantiles τ = 10%, τ = 25%, while it is positive and statistically insignificant
for the quantiles τ = 50%, τ = 75% and τ = 90%. Since the coefficients are either positive
or statistically insignificant, it is not possible to make any conclusion about investor herding
behavior in the Norwegian equity market during the financial crisis. The same conclusion holds
for the period January 2008 to December 2010. Here, the coefficients for γ2 for all quantiles are
positive and statistically insignificant, except for τ = 90% where γ2 is negative and insignificant.
The results further strengthen our earlier findings that the Norwegian market does not appear
to indulge in herd-type trading. At the same time, the model seems not to enable contradiction
of herding, so no distinct conclusion can be made.
Table 9: Quantile regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation
Coefficients τ = 10% τ = 25% τ = 50% τ = 75% τ = 90%
January 08 to December 08
α
0.00722
(0.0000)***
0.00783
(0.0001)***
0.00632
(0.0000)***
0.00794
(0.0000)***
0.00703
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.26787
(0.0000)***
0.23987
(0.0000)***
0.30674
(0.0000)***
0.29828
(0.0000)***
0.29821
(0.0001)***
γ2
1.35928
(0.0477)*
1.67962
(0.0180)*
1.01437
(0.1780)
1.21853
(0.1062)
1.31208
(0.1845)
AR(1) 0.34062(0.0000)***
0.38821
(0.0000)***
0.29786
(0.0000)***
0.54271
(0.0000)***
0.67585
(0.0000)***
January 08 to December 10
α
0.00759
(0.0000)***
0.00820
(0.0000)***
0.00884
(0.0000)***
0.00884
(0.0000)***
0.00962
(0.0000)***
γ1
0.32401
(0.0000)***
0.34805
(0.0000)***
0.35314
(0.0000)***
0.34955
(0.0000)***
0.46794
(0.0618)
γ2
0.86409
(0.0192)*
0.60308
(0.2134)
0.74490
(0.1927)
0.69885
(0.2013)
-0.54887
(0.4885)
AR(1) 0.30390(0.0000)***
0.33627
(0.0000)***
0.42060
(0.0000)***
0.49637
(0.0000)***
0.53502
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
*Level of significance is within 5.0%
5.3 Sector Analysis
So far in this paper, no analysis of market segments has been done. At the same time, it is
well known that the Norwegian market is heavily over-represented by companies related to the
energy market, because of Norway’s strong position within oil production. Therefore, another
relevant question to ask when examining herding behavior in the Norwegian market, is if herding
can be observed in specific sectors of the market. Accordingly, in this section the five largest
sectors on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during the financial crisis are examined.
The five largest sectors on OSE are shown in Table 10 in descending order, together with
the results for each sector. The definitions of the different sectors are given in the Global
Industry Classification Standard (GICS), which is an international industry taxonomy for public
companies, and the definitions are used worldwide (MSCI, 2013). The Energy sector is the largest
sector on OSE and approximately 33% of the companies listed on the Norwegian stock exchange
are in this sector. The second largest sector, Industrials, is almost half the size of the Energy
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sector, while IT, Financials and Consumer Staples are around 1/3 of the size. In Consumer
Staples, 13 out of 14 companies are related to fish production.
Table 10: Regression results for cross-sectional absolute deviation
Sectors α γ1 γ2 AR(1)
Energy 0.00813(0.0000)***
0.33284
(0.0000)***
0.23773
(0.6280)
0.46225
(0.0000)***
Industrials 0.01107(0.0000)***
0.48269
(0.0000)***
0.64923
(0.1740)
0.24619
(0.0000)***
Information
Technology
0.01463
(0.0000)***
0.29770
(0.0000)***
1.64748
(0.0157)*
0.28521
(0.0000)***
Financials 0.00649(0.0000)***
0.50828
(0.0000)***
-0.29405
(0.6000)
0.31759
(0.0000)***
Consumer
Staples
0.00983
(0.0000)***
0.38251
(0.0000)***
1.04220
(0.1740)
0.30439
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
*Level of significance is within 5.0%
Period: Jan. 2008 to Dec. 2010
In Table 10, the non-linear coefficient, γ2, is only significant for the information technology
sector, and no herding is detected since the coefficient is positive. For the rest of the sectors the
coefficient for γ2 is not statistically significant, and therefore no indication of the existence of
herding in these sectors is found.
5.4 Herding based on Excessive Turnover
In this section, the results from the investigation of herding from a volume perspective are
presented. The data used is the thirty smallest firms on OSE as of January 2014. The reason for
the choice of small capitalization stocks is based on the finding by Bessembinder et al. (1996),
namely that firm-specific information has larger proportional effect on the volume of small firms,
and the suggestion of Chen et al. (2004) that herding occurs more easily among small stocks
because of less available information.
According to the market efficiency hypothesis, news affecting the price and thereby the turnover
of a stock should be incorporated in the new stock price after a very short time. This means that
in an efficient market, what happened yesterday should already be reflected in the equilibrium
price, and not affect investors behavior the following day. From the regression in equation 4.9,
autocorrelation in the daily data is detected by a positive and significant ρ2. In the analysis, ρ2
is positive for all thirty firms that are investigated, and significant for 83.33% of them10. This
indicates that the market efficiency hypothesis is not applicable to the smallest firms on the
OSE, i.e. that their prices and turnover are affected by investors’ behavioral biases.
Accordingly, it is interesting to investigate further. This is done by an examination of the
idiosyncratic return and turnover relationship through the regression model 4.10.
10Details can be found in Appendix D.
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Herd behavior is present in a firm if β2 is negative. From Table 11 and 12, β2 is only negative
and significant for two out of thirty firms from 2010 to 2013: Nickel Mountain Group (NMG) in
2011 and Eitzen Chemical (ECHEM) in 2012. Given the results of the two firms’ β3 for the same
year, the results most surely do not descend from informational trading. Accordingly, herding
is only visible in one out of four years, and only for two out of thirty firms, suggesting that the
probability that investors indulge in herd behavior is quite small.
On the other hand, the results from equation 4.9, show something different. The autocorrelation
is highly significant and positive for almost all of the thirty firms. A reason for this can be that
the positive autocorrelaion arise from something other than herd behavior, or it can be that the
regression model in 4.10, is not able to catch the evidence of this abnormal behavior. Regardless
of this, the results found in this section strengthens the findings in the former sections, namely
that herd behavior is not visible in the Norwegian equity market.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, the investment behavior of market participants in Norway, with regard to the
investors’ tendency to exhibit herd behavior, has been examined. Herd behavior is a concept
used to explain the scenario in which investors, rationally or irrationally, confirm with aggregate
market behavior. The main contribution of this paper is to provide more evidence to the investi-
gation of herding behavior in developed markets, represented by Oslo Stock Exchange. The first
part of this paper aims to obtain a valuable understanding of investors’ herding behavior through
a review of earlier literature, and presents preferred explanations and testing methodologies for
herding.
In the empirical test, the CSSD methodology proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) and
the extended version introduced by Chang et al. (2000), namely the Cross-Sectional Standard
Deviation (CSAD) model, has been applied to the data, together with an excessive turnover
model inspired by the work of Chen et al. (2004). The data used consist of four samples covering
different stock categories and time periods from the Norwegian stock market.
The analysis finds no evidence of herding in the Norwegian stock market. The results from the
CSSD and the CSAD approach are congruent, even when we take autocorrelation and different
market conditions into account. We also find that the global financial crisis did not seem to
affect the level of herd behavior in Norway, and this also applies when we consider the entire
OSE and market sectors over the period. This can partially be explained by the fact that the
economic downturn was not as severe in Norway as in many other industrial countries, because
of a range of fiscal and monetary measures that were implemented. In addition, no significant
signs of herding is found in the investigation of herding through a volume perspective (the IR-
model), which strengthens the results given by the cross-sectional approaches. The results from
the IR-model also reduces the possibility that arbitrageurs are offsetting the price deviation that
might arise from unexperienced investors herding towards small capitalization stocks, since this
would have been captured by the model.
Our evidence supports the predictions of rational financial models, and suggests that herding
is not an important factor in determining equity returns in the Norwegian market. Still, the
results do not preclude that herding exists in Norway, because an explanation for not detecting
herd behavior could be that herding has a tendency to form around other indicators than the
market census (Christie and Huang, 1995), and our model seems not to enable contradiction of
herding. Accordingly, no distinct conclusion can be made.
The results should be interpreted cautiously, as there are limitations to the analysis that needs
to be considered. First, the inclusion of a higher number of stocks and a longer time period could
have resulted in different findings. Also, the uncertain indication of non-stationarity in one of
the data sets that is discovered could be investigated further, and if necessary the data could
be made stationary or a rolling regression could be carried out. Beyond these limitations, the
empirical study was also not able to categorize the market volatility in terms of investor types,
making it impossible to differentiate between herding by private and institutional investors. Even
if these limitations were removed, the greatest challenge for empirical studies on herd behavior
is to determine the cause of herding, and whether herding was intentional or unintentional.
The present and most other studies have concentrated on price patterns and volume only, while
proper tests for herding require data on how investors communicate with each other and how
individuals follow one another in time, controlled for ‘fundamental changes’.
A natural extension of our empirical analysis in section 5 would be to include more stocks and
extend the time horizon of the analysis. In addition, it would be worthwhile to differentiate be-
tween large and small firms, since earlier studies suggest that informational asymmetries could
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be more evident among small companies (see e.g. Saastamoinen, 2008). Suggested future re-
search also includes the implementation of an international model that compares the Norwegian
market to other global markets, especially less developed countries. Finally, it would be interest-
ing to compare the current findings with those obtained from other methodologies, as alternative
methods might result in different results.
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Conclusion
We have examined the investment behavior of market participants in the Norwegian equity mar-
ket, with specific regard to the investors’ tendency to exhibit two separate behavioral finance
phenomena: The Disposition Effect and Herding Behavior. In general, behavior finance theories
try to explain finance and investing from a human perspective, with the argument that finance
must reflect the way that people really behave - and normal people usually do not behave ratio-
nally (Frankfurter and McGoun, 2002). Psychology-based finance models are developing, with
the rationale that whatever investors do is going to be psychological. At the same time, despite
the growing progress, behavioral finance is still at an early stage (Van der Sar, 2004).
Behavioral finance can be regarded as a moderate, agnostic approach to study financial markets
(Thaler, 1999). It is difficult to be agnostic without accepting the existence of the underlying
’religion’ (i.e. standard finance theory) and making it the benchmark against which everything is
judged. The financial market anomalies demonstrate the need for a change of focus from market
efficiency to behavioral modeling, as sentiment impacts the prices and volumes of all assets.
Some behavioral finance theoreticians suggest that behavioral finance will not be a separate
discipline, but will instead increasingly be part of ’mainstream’ finance (Ritter, 2003).
However, Bloomfield (2006) indicates that no behavioral alternative will ever match the coher-
ence, parsimony and power of traditional efficient markets theory, because psychological forces
are too complex. In addition, a major criticism of behavioral finance is that it is a concoction
of numerous psychological effects, sometimes contradictory, so that no matter what happens
in the market, there is a psychological effect that can be mustered to explain it (Frankfurter
and McGoun, 2002). Accordingly, it is possible to ex post explain anomalies in the markets by
finding a behavioral finance theory that fits the facts, and behavioral finance lacks a common
accepted definition. For instance, there is no single preference framework to accommodate the
features of the behavioral finance phenomena studied in this thesis, i.e. the disposition effect
and herding behavior. Nevertheless, behavioral researchers in finance continue to document and
refine our understanding of how psychological forces influence individual behavior in financial
settings.
From the results in this thesis, it can be presumed that there exists a few incidents of psycho-
logical factors, specifically the disposition effect and herd behavior, affecting prices and volumes
in the Norwegian stock market. At the same time, it is difficult to make a distinct conclusion,
as the thesis has only scratched the surface in understanding financial decision making in Nor-
way from a behavioral viewpoint. The evidence from the tests leads to further questions, for
example what the factors are that lead to different reactions among Norwegian investors, and
who is trading with the investors that are prone to the behavioral biases? In addition, it would
be interesting to compare the results from Norway with other countries to investigate if the
biases affect different cultures in different ways, as experiences and history can affect financial
decision-making (Baker and Nofsinger, 2002).
There are probably other explanations for the results presented in this thesis, as the evidence
does not allow for distinguishing between several behavioral finance hypotheses about investor
behavior. Given that our analysis suggests that investor expectations in Norway are systemati-
cally biased, further research that attempts to identify explanations for the empirical evidence
in Norway beyond the disposition effect and herding behavior would be of interest. Still, there
is a long way to go from the level of understanding we have now to the day when it is possible
to fully comprehend investor behavior - if that day ever comes.
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Appendices
A Stocks in the OBX index
Table A: Stocks in the OBX index
Ticker Name Ticker Name
STL Statoil DNB DNB
TEL Telenor SDRL Seadrill
YAR Yara International NHY Norsk Hydro
GJF GjensidigeForsikring RCL
Royal Caribbean
Cruises Ltd.
ORK Orkla SUBC Subsea 7 S.A.
SCH Schibsted MGH Marine Harvest
AKSO Aker Solutions ASA FOE
Fred. Olsen Energy
ASA
STB Storebrand PGS
Petroleum
Geo-Services
TGS
TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical
Company
DNO DNO International
DETNOR Det norskeoljeselskap PRS
Prosafe
ALGETA Algeta ASA NAS
Norwegian Air
Shuttle
REC Renewable EnergyCorporation PLCS
Polarcus
EMGS ElectromagneticGeoservices SONG
Songa Offshore
FRO Frontline Ltd. CEQ Cermaq
GOGL Golden OceanGroup QEC
Questerre Energy
Corporation
KOA KongsbergAutomotive Holding NPRO
Norwegian Property
ASA
NSG Norskeskogindustrier AKER
Aker ASA
TOM Tomra Systems SNI
Stolt-Nielsen
Limited
JIN Jinhui Shipping andTransportation ELT
Eltek
EKO Ekornes TAD Tandberg Data
ELK Elkem TAA Tandberg ASA
OCR Ocean Rig FAST
Fast Search and
Transfer
FJO Fjord Seafood ASA TAT Tandberg Television
SME Smedvig ASA AIK Aktiv Kapita ASA
OPC Opticom ASA NER NERA ASA
EDBASA EDB BusinessPartner AHM
Amersham plc
TCO TeleComputing ASA VIS Visma ASA
ii DURBIN-WATSON RESULTS
B Durbin-Watson results
Table C: Durbin-Watson results
Regressions WithoutAR(1) With AR(1)
CSSD 1% 1.1139(0.0000)***
2.247
(1.0000)
CSSD 5% 1.1128(0.0000)***
2.245
(1.0000)
CSAD OBX 0.8236(0.0000)***
2.3569
(1.0000)
CSAD UP 1% 0.6710(0.0000)***
2.4439
(1.0000)
CSAD DOWN 1% 0.7209(0.0000)***
2.493
(1.0000)
CSAD UP 5% 0.7004(0.0000)***
2.4226
(1.0000)
CSAD DOWN 5% 0.7520(0.0000)***
2.4828
(1.0000)
CSAD OBX Panel A 0.5859(0.0000)***
2.6197
(1.0000)
CSAD OBX Panel B 1.0162(0.0000)***
2.3857
(1.0000)
CSAD Panel A 0.8808(0.0000)***
1.7113
(0.0100)**
CSAD Panel B 1.0294(0.0000)***
1.9613
(0.2902)
CSAD Energy 1.2139(0.0000)***
2.2454
(0.9996)
CSAD Industrials 1.4198(0.0000)***
2.0004
(0.4955)
CSAD Infor. Tech. 1.5209(0.0000)***
2.1842
(0.9940)
CSAD Financials 1.4006(0.0000)***
2.2060
(0.9975)
CSAD Consumer 1.6596(0.0000)***
2.2896
(1.0000)
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
**Level of significance is within 1.0%
AUTOCORRELATION IN ABNORMAL TURNOVER iii
C Autocorrelation in abnormal turnover
Table E: Autocorrelation
Firm γ2 Firm γ2
DIAG 0.42448(0.0000)*** PDR
0.15462
(0.0000)***
NMG 0.30458(0.0000)*** BERGEN
0.03906
(0.2163)
REPANT 0.48281(0.0000)*** NAUR
0.58292
(0.0000)***
DOM 0.51024(0.0000)*** NIO
0.01186
(0.7074)
ECHEM 0.69580(0.0000)*** BIRD
0.29156
(0.0000)***
COMROD 0.02932(0.3534) PSI
0.11321
(0.0003)***
RGT 0.23876(0.0000)*** BOR
0.08274
(0.0087)**
EMS 0.39910(0.0000)*** ITE
0.08326
(0.0083)**
BLO 0.22930(0.0000)*** REACH
0.56298
(0.0000)***
OTS 0.19913(0.0000)*** APP
0.11626
(0.0015)**
COV 0.24218(0.0000)*** IMSK
0.01211
(0.7014)
NAVA 0.17926(0.0000)*** BEL
0.30660
(0.0000)***
SBX 0.14649(0.0000)*** AQUA
0.51715
(0.0000)***
SCI 0.67974(0.0000)*** KIT
0.00096
(0.9758)
ITX 0.13304(0.0002)*** FUNCOM
0.54618
(0.0000)***
***Level of significance is within 0.1%
**Level of significance is within 1.0%
